

National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East Wars, 11 October 1943 - File No. 6

(2)

**DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]**

| DOCUMENT NUMBER   | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS  | DATE        | RESTRICTION |  |  |
|---|---------------|--|-------------|-------------|--|--|
| 1   | note          | From Faisal to Nixon<br>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-45/21            | 11 Oct 73   | B           |  |  |
| 2   | telegram      | From AmEmb Amman to SecState<br>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-45/22    | 11 Oct 73   | B           |  |  |
| 3   | telegram      | From AmEmb Amman to SecState<br>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-45/23    | 11 Oct 73   | B           |  |  |
| 4   | telegram      | From AmEmb Tel Aviv to SecState<br>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-45/24 | 11 Oct 73   | B           |  |  |
| 5   | report        | Dept. of State, ME<br>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-45/25              | 11 Oct 73   | B           |  |  |
| 6   | report        | ME Hostilities<br>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-45/26                  | 11 OCT 73   | B           |  |  |
| FILE GROUP TITLE  |               |  | BOX NUMBER  |             |  |  |
| <u>NSC</u><br>Harold H. Sanders Files, Middle East<br>Negotiation Files |               |  | <u>1174</u> |             |  |  |
| FOLDER TITLE  |               | Middle East War File, Oct 11, 1973<br><u>(2)</u>                         |             |             |  |  |
| RESTRICTION CODES   |               |  |             |             |  |  |

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

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| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS                                  | DATE      | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------|---------------|--|-----------|-------------|
| 7               | Telegarm      | From Am Emb Jidda to Sec State                                   | 11 OCT 73 | B<br>1 PP   |
| 8               | Telegarm      | From Am Emb Jidda to Sec State                                   | 11 OCT 73 | B<br>2 PP   |
| 9               | report        | ME Hostilities<br>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-45/27          | 11 OCT 73 | B<br>6 PP   |
| 10              | report        | ME Hostilities<br>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-45/28          | 11 OCT 73 | B<br>6 PP   |
| 11              | report        | Selected Troops on Alert<br>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-59/2 | 11 OCT 73 | B<br>1 P    |
| 12              | cable         | From CIA to State<br>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-45/29       | 12 OCT 73 | B<br>2 PP   |
| 13              | Telegarm      | To White House<br>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 02-45/30          | 11 OCT 73 | B<br>2 PP   |

|                  |  |            |
|------------------|--|------------|
| FILE GROUP TITLE | Harold H. Saunders Files; Middle East<br>NSC Negotiation Files | BOX NUMBER |
|------------------|--|------------|

1174

|              |   |     |
|--------------|---|-----|
| FOLDER TITLE | Middle East War File 6, Oct 11, 1973<br>(2) | (2) |
|--------------|---|-----|

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- |  |  |
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| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS          | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------|---------------|--|------------|-------------|
| 14              | telegram      | From... Tim Kline Toldia ... 1, b<br>2PP | 11 OCT '73 | B           |
| 15              | telegram      | USMISSION USVN to Sec State 1 P          | 10/11/73   | B           |

|                  |   |            |
|------------------|---|------------|
| FILE GROUP TITLE | Harold H Saunders Files: Middle East<br>NSC Negotiation Files | BOX NUMBER |
|------------------|---|------------|

|              |                                       |     |
|--------------|---------------------------------------|-----|
| FOLDER TITLE | (2) Middle East War File Oct 11, 1973 | (3) |
|--------------|---------------------------------------|-----|

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|-----------------|---------------|----------------------------------|-----------|-------------|
| 1               | note          | from Faizal to Nixon             | 11 Oct 73 | B           |
| 2               | telegram      | from AmEmb Amman to Sec State    | 11 Oct 73 | B           |
| 3               | telegram      | from AmEmb Amman to Sec State    | 11 Oct 73 | B           |
| 4               | telegram      | from AmEmb Tel Aviv to Sec State | 11 Oct 73 | B           |
| 5               | report        | Dept. of State, ME               | 11 Oct 73 | B           |
| 6               | report        | ME Hostilities                   | 11 OCT 73 | B           |

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

1174

FOLDER TITLE

(2)

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BOX NUMBER

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| FILE GROUP TITLE         |               | BOX NUMBER                      |           |             |
| NSC                      |               | 1174                            |           |             |
| FOLDER TITLE             |               | (2)                             |           |             |
| <b>RESTRICTION CODES</b> |               |                                 |           |             |

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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COPY 7 OF 15 COPIES *WHT*

*WHT*

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

**SECRET**

CONTROL: 2959  
RECD: 11 OCT '73 3:49P

Z 111941Z OCT 73 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USINT CAIRO FLASH 4649  
BT  
S E C R E T STATE 201697

NODIS

E.O. 11652 - XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR, US, UR  
SUBJECT: CONTACT WITH SOVIET IN CAIRO

REF: **CAIRO 3052** ← 7

YOU SHOULD FIND EXCUSE FOR CANCELLING MEETING WITH LEO  
YEDRASHNIKOV AND AVOID FURTHER SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS  
WITH HIM. WE WANT TO AVOID CROSSING WIRES BY MULTIPLE  
CONTACTS WITH SOVIETS. YOU SHOWED GOOD JUDGMENT IN  
NOT SEEKING TO RESPOND TO POINTS YEDRASHNIKOV MADE TO  
YOU. KISSINGER

BT

#1697

DRAFTED BY: NEA: ALATHERTON, JR.

APPROVED BY: NEA: JOSEPH J. SISC

CLEARANCES: S/S MR. GAMMON

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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Department of State *Way*  
**TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 770

PAGE 01 USUN N 03839 112152Z

71  
ACTION IN-14

VN

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00  
USSS-00 AF-10 ARA-10 EA-11 RSC-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00  
PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAF-00 NSC-10 PA-03 PRS-01  
SPC-03 SS-15 ACDA-19 USIE-00 INRE-00 TRSE-00 MBFR-01  
SAJ-01 DRC-01 /168 W

079267

O R 112114Z OCT 73  
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 97  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
USINT CAIRO  
AMCONGEN JERUSALEM

*SYG Statement*

UNCLAS USUN 3839

F.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: PFOR, UN, XF  
SUBJ: SYG STATEMENT ON ME

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SYG STATEMENT ON ME SITUATION ISSUED AS UN PRESS RELEASE AFTERNOON OCTOBER 11. SYG ALSO TRANSMITTED STATEMENT TO PRES OF SC WITH REQUEST IT BE CIRCULATED IMMEDIATELY TO COUNCIL MEMBERS:

"I HAVE UP TILL NOW REFRAINED FROM MAKING A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE CONFLICT IN THE ME, BECAUSE I DID NOT WANT IN ANY WAY TO INTERFERE WITH THE EFFORTS OF THE SC, WHICH UNDER THE CHARTER HAS THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

UNCLASSIFIED  
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 USUN N 03839 112152Z

"NOW, HOWEVER, AFTER MORE THAN FIVE DAYS OF HEAVY FIGHTING WHICH HAS ALREADY CAUSED APPALLING HUMAN LOSSES, I FEEL OBLIGED TO SPEAK OUT AS SYG. NONE OF THE PARTIES IS PREPARED TO CONCEDE ITS OBJECTIVES, EITHER MILITARY OR POLITICAL. THEY WOULD APPEAR, THEREFORE, TO BE EMBARKED ON A WAR OF ATTRITION WITH THE GRAVEST CONSEQUENCES NOT ONLY FOR THE REGION ITSELF, BUT FOR THE WORLD COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE. WHO CAN POSSIBLY BENEFIT FROM SUCH A DEVELOPMENT? IF THE WAR CONTINUES, IT WILL POSE AN INCREASING THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN A MUCH WIDER CONTEXT.

"I AM DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THIS PROSPECT. I, LIKE SO MANY OTHERS, AM PROFOUNDLY DISTRESSED TO OBSERVE DAY BY DAY THE LOSS OF COUNTLESS LIVES, THE DESTRUCTION AND MISERY, AND THE INCREASING DANGER TO CIVILIAN POPULATIONS.

"I AM ALSO PROFOUNDLY CONCERNED WITH THE ROLE OF THE UN IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF OUR ORGANIZATION IS THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. IF WE FAIL IN THAT ROLE, THE CENTRAL POINT OF THE ORGANIZATION'S EXISTENCE IS JEOPARDIZED.

"I KNOW VERY WELL THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL REASONS WHY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS NOT AT PRESENT IN A POSITION TO EXERCISE A DECISIVE INFLUENCE IN THIS AFFAIR. THAT SITUATION HAS OCCURRED BEFORE AND IT WILL DOUBTLESS OCCUR AGAIN.

"BUT AFTER MORE THAN FIVE DAYS OF THIS TERRIBLE WAR I FEEL IT IS MY DUTY AS SYG OF THE UN TO URGE THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO CONSIDER ONCE AGAIN HOW THE OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE AND PEACEFUL ACTION CAN BE SURMOUNTED AND THE PRIMARY ROLE OF THE COUNCIL CAN BE REASSERTED IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE.

"I HAVE NO DETAILED SOLUTION TO SUGGEST. I DO, HOWEVER, EARNESTLY APPEAL TO ALL THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO LOOK URGENTLY TO THE POSSIBILITY OF TURNING THIS TRAGIC CONFLICT INTO A STARTING POINT FOR A NEW EFFORT AT A REAL SETTLEMENT.

UNCLASSIFIED



*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 USUN N 03839 112152Z

"I BELIEVE THAT IF THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED WERE TO TAKE THIS ATTITUDE, THEY WOULD FIND IN THE USE OF THE INSTRUMENTALITIES TO ASSIST THEM TO GO FORWARD. NATURALLY WE IN THE SECRETARIAT STAND READY TO PROVIDE WHATEVER ASSISTANCE WE CAN. I AM ENCOURAGED TO NOTE THAT SOME GOVERNMENTS HAVE DECLARED THEIR READINESS TO ASSIST.

"I HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT HOW DIFFICULT IT IS FOR COUNTRIES IN CONFLICT TO TURN FROM WAR TO PEACE. I HAVE NO WISH TO DEFLECT ANY GOVERNMENT FROM WHAT IT BELIEVED TO BE ITS LEGITIMATE SOVEREIGN AIMS. I DO, HOWEVER, QUESTION WHETHER THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR CAN POSSIBLY ACHIEVE THOSE AIMS PERMANENTLY FOR ANY OF THE PARTIES. I AM ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE WIDER THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY WHICH THIS SITUATION MAY CREATE.

"I THEREFORE EARNESTLY APPEAL TO THE CONFLICTING GOVERNMENTS TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE COURSES BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE, SO THAT FIGHTING AND BLOODSHED MAY CEASE. I ALSO HOPE THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AS WELL AS OTHER MEMBER STATES, WILL REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS TO SEEK AN END TO THE FIGHTING AND AN IMMEDIATE AND DETERMINED RESUMPTION OF THE QUEST FOR A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT IN THE ME."

SCALI

UNCLASSIFIED



*10/18/*  
*10/18/*  
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 104

PAGE 01 STATE 202319

70  
ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISU-00 CGO-00 INRF-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00  
USIE-00 CTAE-00 DUDE-00 PM-07 H-03 TNR-10 L-03  
NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15  
ACDA-19 10-15 ARA-16 EA-11 EUR-25 AIU-20 PC-04 SAJ-01  
OMB-01 USSS-00 /191 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/P:RWRIGHT:SKG  
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTONJR  
NEA/ARN:DAKORN  
S/PRS:PHARE  
S/S-D:RWRIGHT

----- 080366 -----

0 112247Z OCT 73  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TU ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE  
AMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 202319

E.O. 11562: N/A  
TAGS: MARR, EG  
SUBJECT: EGYPT ACCUSES U.S. OF STRAFING

1. AT 1850 WASHINGTON TIME OCT 11, DEPT SPOKESMAN,  
RESPONDING TO EGYPTIAN ALLEGATION ATTRIBUTED TO WESTERN  
DIPLOMATIC SOURCES (MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY 11 OCT FBIS  
173) THAT U.S. CARRIER-BASED PHANTOMS TODAY TOOK PART IN  
STRAFING EGYPTIAN POSITIONS, SAID QUOTE THIS IS A MIS-  
CHIEVOUS AND OUTRAGEOUS LIE. I WANT TO EMPHASITICALLY DENY  
THAT AMERICAN-OPERATED AIRCRAFT ARE INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN  
THE FIGHTING IN THE MIDDLE EAST. END QUOTE. KISSINGER

UNCLASSIFIED

45



Department of State TELEGRAM

Way

SECRET 923

PAGE 01 CAIRO 03054 111708Z

64  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO=00 CCO=00 SSO=00 NSCE=00 DODE=00 CIAE=00

USSS-00 NSAE-00 1020 W

R 111545Z ACT 73  
FM USINT CAIRO  
TO SFCSTATE WASHDC 3968  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
USMISSION USUN

6 11 2 4 7 10 3 8 4

EXD1S

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR FG UR

SUBJECT: EVACUATION OF SOVIET DEPENDENTS FROM EGYPT  
BEFORE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

1. TASS AGENCY REP IN CAIRO WHO IS BELIEVED TO BE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH SOVIET EMBASSY HAS TOLD US THAT SOVIETS FIRST LEARNED OF EGYPTIANS' PLANS FOR ATTACK ACROSS CANAL AT END OF SEPTEMBER. ON OCTOBER 3, SOVIET AMBASSADOR VINOGRADOV SAW SADAT. VINOGRADOV UNDERSTOOD FROM SADAT'S REMARKS THAT ATTACK WAS IMMINENT. TASS REP STATES SADAT DID NOT INFORM VINOGRADOV DIRECTLY, BUT HINTED AT RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. VINOGRADOV RECOMMENDED IMMEDIATE EVACUATION OF DEPENDENTS OF SOVIET TECHNICIANS IN EGYPT AT THAT TIME, AND SOVIET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT WERE CALLED IN FROM ALL COUNTRIES IN NEAR VICINITY TO ASSIST IN EVACUATION.

2. TASS REP STATES THAT ON OCTOBER 10, WIVES OF SOVIET EMBASSY PERSONNEL WITH SMALL CHILDREN DEPARTED CAIRO. SOME FAMILIES STILL REMAIN.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY




Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 03054 111708Z

3. TASS RFP ADDED THAT SOVIET TECHNICIANS HAD DEPARTED EGYPT, BUT DID NOT SAY WHEN.  
SMITH



Department of State

War

TELETYPE  
TELEGRAMS  
TELETYPE  
TELEGRAMS

SECRET 548

3

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05441 111939Z

FILE

Son

62  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 TSO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

NSAE-00 USSS-00 1020 W

077083

P R 111645Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WAHSHDC PRIORITY 9686  
INFO USINT CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMCQNSUL JERUSALEM  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
USUN 2616

✓/12  
⑥  
ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_ R  
LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_  
NEGROPONTE \_\_\_\_\_  
ODELN \_\_\_\_\_  
PAPILLION \_\_\_\_\_  
RODON \_\_\_\_\_  
SAUNDERS \_\_\_\_\_  
SCHEFFELT \_\_\_\_\_  
V. I. G. \_\_\_\_\_  
VALSH \_\_\_\_\_

S E C R E T AMMAN 5441

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, FX  
SUBJECT: SOVIET FOREWARNING X

FOR THE HISTORICAL RECORD SADAT TOLD KHAMMASH TODAY THAT  
SOVIETS WERE NOTIFIED OF SYRIAN-EGYPTIAN ATTACK ONE HOUR  
BEFORE IT TOOK PLACE.

BROWN

SECRET  
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

WASHINGTON 20547

War

October 11, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: State/NEA - Mr. Atherton

SUBJECT: Public Statement Options on  
Arms Question

U. S. military supplies to Israel are becoming increasingly the focus of Arab concern. Speculation began in the Beirut press Tuesday, expanded to other Arab media (Jidda, Khartoum, etc.) yesterday, and today Arab media have U. S. press reports of shipments leaving a base in Virginia and of U. S. officials considering an acceleration of arms shipments. We would like to submit for the Department's consideration an analysis of anticipated public and media reaction to various public statements the U. S. Government might make.

As we see it, the U. S. is facing two contingencies: I. agreeing to a speedup of arms deliveries or a new arms package for Israel, or II. simply continuing previously-committed arms shipments to Israel. For each of these two contingencies, there are several options on the handling of public statements about them. Here are the options and what we believe, based on past experience and current indications, that the Arab and Israeli public reactions would be:

CONTINGENCY I:

If the U. S. in fact does decide to make up some of the current Israeli losses, by new sales or a speedup of deliveries, these are the ways the story could be handled, and the probable outcomes:

1. No comment, citing past practice of not commenting on military supplies to the Mideast. The most probable result will be that

-- The American media will obtain details from their

CONFIDENTIAL

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-2-

contacts in Washington, and publish them. These stories will be picked up by wire services and make frontpages throughout the Mideast. Most Arab media will accept the stories as true, even though they have not been officially endorsed, because (a) often such stories have turned out to be true in the past, (b) the story confirms Arab fears and Israeli hopes, (c) many Arabs assume that a story in the media about the government which is not denied must be true, as would be the case in their country.

-- The Israeli editorial reaction will be favorable and Arab unfavorable, but the intensity of this will depend largely on the military situation at the time. Radical Arab media will in any case condemn the U. S. for "saving" Israel or "encouraging aggression" and call for acts against U. S. interests in the Mideast; moderate Arab media may not comment at all and may downplay the story if the Arabs are doing well on the battlefield but if they are not, even moderate Arab comment will blame the U. S. for "preventing Arab victory".

2. An official USG announcement of the new sale, citing only a need to "maintain the arms balance". The reaction will be basically the same as the above.
3. An official USG announcement of the new sale, with an explanation along these lines:

The USG had called for restraint but that the Russians had poured arms into Syria and Egypt during the fighting, fueling the fire. The U. S. had not acted at all at first, but finally made a reluctant decision when it appeared that Israel was at a disadvantage because of the new Russian arms. The reaction would probably be:

-- Israeli media would mildly criticize U. S. hesitation, but at the same time appreciate the help in time of need.

-- Arab radical media would ignore the U. S. explanation and simply announce the U. S. decision, attacking it strongly in editorials as "saving" Israel or encouraging Israeli "aggression", and calling for some kind of action against U. S. interests, depending on the stage of the war

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at that moment. Moderate Arab media would carry the U. S. explanation including details of the Soviet move, and editorial reaction would be somewhat milder than under alternatives 1 or 2.

CONTINGENCY II:

If the U. S. decides merely to continue old commitments to Israel (as the Norfolk story indicates is happening), not accelerating these shipments or agreeing to new sales, this could be handled in several ways:

1. No comment. The result would probably be the same as in #1, above, since details will get into the wire services and without specific statements to the contrary, Arab and Israeli audiences will come to their own conclusions. Many Arabs will assume this is a big new arms deal. However, if the stories become widely current, Israel may knock down the assumption that new commitments were made, which would probably convince the Israeli media and public but not the Arab.
2. Denial of stories that new commitments were made. If made while Israel is in trouble militarily, this would evoke criticism in the Israeli press, and might encourage Arab commentators to call for the destruction of Israel rather than limited goals in the war. If made after Israel recovered ground lost since Saturday, the story would be played up by Israeli media as proof that Israel had done it alone. Arab media, on the other hand, would be split: radical media would probably ignore the denial and carry the story as fact, "proving" the U. S. saved Israel, while moderate media would carry the denial and not comment.

RECOMMENDATION:

Contingency I (new sales or acceleration of shipments): use option 3, giving a detailed explanation

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Contingency II (continuation of old commitments) use option 2,  
denying new sales agreements or acceleration of deliveries.

William K. Payeff  
Assistant Director  
(Near East and  
North Africa)

cc: I - Mr. Kopp  
State/P - Mr. Briggs  
NSC - Mr. Quandt✓

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INTERNAL NSC ROUT

CLIFT \_\_\_\_\_

COOPER \_\_\_\_\_

DAVIS \_\_\_\_\_

EAGLEBURGER \_\_\_\_\_

ELLIOTT \_\_\_\_\_

FROEBE \_\_\_\_\_

HORAN \_\_\_\_\_

JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_

KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_

LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_

MARSHALL \_\_\_\_\_

ODEEN \_\_\_\_\_

RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_

SAUNDERS X EGI \_\_\_\_\_

SOLOMON \_\_\_\_\_

SONNENFELDT \_\_\_\_\_

STEARMAN \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

ADMIN \_\_\_\_\_

(TURN THIS TAB UP TO MOVE  
BACK TO THE SECRETARIAT)

## NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

|     |      |          |                  |
|-----|------|----------|------------------|
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| MO  | DAY  | MO DA HR | 316              |

| DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASgmt  | SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION   |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|--|--|--|--|--|------------|----------------------------|----------|--|----------|--|----------|-------|-------------------|---------------------------|----------|------------------------|----------|------------|----------|--------------------------|----------|------------|--|--|--|---------------------------------|--|-----------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--------------------------------|--|--|--|-------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|----------------------|--|--|--|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|-----------|----------|---|----------|--------|----------|------|-------------------|---|----------|---|----------|---|----------|----------|----------|
|  | TO: PRES<br>KISSINGER<br>SCOWCROFT   | FROM: ROGERS<br>RICHARDSON<br>SCHLESINGER<br>ELIOT | UNCLAS<br>LOU<br>C<br>S<br>TS              | LOG IN/OUT ONLY<br>NO FORN<br>EYES ONLY<br>CODEWORD<br>SENSITIVE |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  | <i>Pickering X</i><br><b>SUBJECT:</b> Memorandum of Carter Tarr, William Lewis & James Deane<br><i>of State Dept w/ Ze'ev Shor &amp; Menachem Nivneh of Israeli<br/>   Embassy re and to Israel</i><br><b>REFERENCE:</b> S/S 7319350 OTHER <i>NOT RECORDED</i> |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
| INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION  |  |  | ACTION REQUIRED                            |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  | ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT   |  | ACTION                                     | INFO   | REC CY FOR |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  | STAFF SECRETARY  |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  | FAR EAST   |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  | SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA   |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  | MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA   |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  | EUROPE / CANADA  |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  | LATIN AMERICA  |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  | UNITED NATIONS   |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  | ECONOMIC   |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  | SCIENTIFIC   |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  | NET ASSESSMENT GROUP   |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  | PROGRAM ANALYSIS   |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  | NSC PLANNING   |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  | CONGRESSIONAL  |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  | OCEANS POLICY  |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  |  |  | COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
| IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: <input type="checkbox"/>  |  |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
| <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>DATE</th> <th>FROM</th> <th>TO</th> <th>S</th> <th>SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):</th> <th>CY TO</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>10/18</td> <td></td> <td><i>Saunders C</i></td> <td></td> <td><i>for information</i></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td><i>FYI</i></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td><i>SAUNDERS</i></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>   |  |  |  |  |            | DATE                       | FROM     | TO                                       | S        | SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN): | CY TO    | 10/18 |                   | <i>Saunders C</i>         |          | <i>for information</i> |          |            |          |                          |          | <i>FYI</i> |  |  |  |                                 |  | <i>SAUNDERS</i> |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
| DATE   | FROM   | TO   | S  | SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):                           | CY TO      |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
| 10/18  |  | <i>Saunders C</i>                                  |  | <i>for information</i>   |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
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|  |  |  |  | <i>SAUNDERS</i>  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  |  |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
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| <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="2">SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS</th> <th colspan="4">DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ &amp; DATE _____</th> </tr> <tr> <th colspan="2">INSTR</th> <th colspan="4">SPECIAL DISPOSITION _____</th> </tr> <tr> <th colspan="2">NSC/S DISP</th> <th colspan="4">OR RECORD COMMENT: _____</th> </tr> <tr> <th colspan="2"></th> <th colspan="4">CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____</th> </tr> <tr> <th colspan="2"></th> <th colspan="4">CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____</th> </tr> <tr> <th colspan="2"></th> <th colspan="4">SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION &amp; FILING.</th> </tr> <tr> <th colspan="2"></th> <th colspan="4">SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: <i>X</i></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td colspan="6">MICROFILM &amp; FILE RQMTS:</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="6">M/F'D _____ BY _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="6"> <table border="1"> <tr> <td>CYS FOR )</td> <td>SA _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td>)</td> <td>HP _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ORIG )</td> <td>WH _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td>TO )</td> <td>PA <i>X</i> _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td>)</td> <td>SF _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td>)</td> <td>NS _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td>)</td> <td>EP _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DESTROY)</td> <td>DY _____</td> </tr> </table> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> |  |  |  |  |            | SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS |          | DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ |          |  |          | INSTR |                   | SPECIAL DISPOSITION _____ |          |                        |          | NSC/S DISP |          | OR RECORD COMMENT: _____ |          |            |  |  |  | CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____ |  |                 |  |  |  | CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____ |  |  |  |  |  | SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING. |  |  |  |  |  | SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: <i>X</i> |  |  |  | MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: |  |  |  |  |  | M/F'D _____ BY _____ |  |  |  |  |  | <table border="1"> <tr> <td>CYS FOR )</td> <td>SA _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td>)</td> <td>HP _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td>ORIG )</td> <td>WH _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td>TO )</td> <td>PA <i>X</i> _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td>)</td> <td>SF _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td>)</td> <td>NS _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td>)</td> <td>EP _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DESTROY)</td> <td>DY _____</td> </tr> </table> |  |  |  |  |  | CYS FOR ) | SA _____ | ) | HP _____ | ORIG ) | WH _____ | TO ) | PA <i>X</i> _____ | ) | SF _____ | ) | NS _____ | ) | EP _____ | DESTROY) | DY _____ |
| SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS   |  | DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____           |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
| INSTR  |  | SPECIAL DISPOSITION _____                          |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
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|  |  | CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____                    |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
|  |  | CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____           |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
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|  |  | SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: <i>X</i>                     |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
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| ORIG )   | WH _____   |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
| TO )   | PA <i>X</i> _____  |  |  |  |            |                            |          |  |          |  |          |       |                   |                           |          |                        |          |            |          |                          |          |            |  |  |  |                                 |  |                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |                                |  |  |  |                         |  |  |  |  |  |                      |  |  |  |  |  |   |  |  |  |  |  |           |          |   |          |        |          |      |                   |   |          |   |          |   |          |          |          |
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Approved in T 10/18/73

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

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Date 10-18-73  
Initial E.K.

**Memorandum of Conversation**

7319350

5816

W/H

W/OV

DATE: October 11, 1973

*Sher - some war  
too*

**SUBJECT:** Assistance to Israel

**PARTICIPANTS:** Mr. Ze'ev Sher, Economic Minister, Embassy of Israel  
Mr. Menachem Naveh, Economic Counselor, Embassy  
of Israel

Dr. Curtis W. Tarr, Under Secretary for Security  
Assistance  
Mr. William H. Lewis, Special Assistant to Under  
Secretary for Security Assistance  
Mr. James C. Dean, NEA/IAI

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|-------------------|----------|---------------|-----------|
|                   | D.       | WH            |           |
|                   | P        | CIA           |           |
|                   | E        | DOD           |           |
|                   | T-2      | LEA           |           |
|                   | S/PC     | IO            |           |
|                   | S/S      | AID           |           |
|                   |          | Tel Aviv      |           |

Mr. Sher began by saying that he thought it was proper to tell Dr. Tarr in a very general way what the impact of the present war was on the Israeli economy and on Israel's needs for assistance in the future. Sher was not requesting anything specific. However, he did want us to know that each day of the war cost the Israelis approximately \$250 million and it was estimated that the minimum cost for a war was about \$2 billion. It was impossible to calculate the economic costs with any precision, for in addition to the immediate costs of materiel and loss of production, one also had to include the indirect costs such as pensions and medical assistance plus the effects on trade and tourism.

Sher wanted us to know that the GOI's previous forecasts on GNP, foreign exchange reserve levels, and foreign exchange expenditures would, of course, have to be altered in light of the war. He was not in a position to offer any estimates at the present time and it would probably be at least two months

NEA/IAI:JCDean:kha  
*(Drafting Office and Officer)*

FORM DS-1254  
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GDS - DECLAS Dec. 31, 1979

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-2-

before any approximations could be made. Sher noted that Israel was mobilizing its own resources; a new system of compulsory defense loans had been established for both individuals and corporations in addition to already high taxes and Sher personally expected additional indirect taxation. Sher stated that frankly he didn't know what to ask for. The first and overriding objective of the GOI was to win the war. Everything we were discussing was secondary. Sher said that he did not know if the situation had ever been as grave as it presently is in Israel. Even in the War of Independence the economy had not developed to a high level and there was not as much to lose. It seemed to Sher that a great deal more resources would be needed in the future in order to provide an effective deterrent.

Under Secretary Tarr expressed our sympathy and our concern for the present situation in Israel. He assured Mr. Sher as in the past, any Israeli request for assistance would be given careful consideration.

On his way out Mr. Sher told Mr. Dean that he was holding similar meetings today with officials in the NSC, AID, Treasury and OMB.

Clearance:  
NEA - Mr. Atherton  
(in draft)

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Department of State *Urg* TELEGRAM

SECRET 147

PAGE 01 STATE 201481

3

51  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-71 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 CCO-00  
USSS-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN:HLK  
APPROVED BY NEA - JOSEPH J. C.  
DSO/JSA/NESA - COL. PIANTRA/MR. BLI  
PM - MR. KINSOLVING  
S/S-0 - MR. TWOHIE  
NEA - MR. ATHERTON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY ROME NJACT IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 201481

EXDIS

F.O. 11652 - GUS  
TAGS: MASS, IS  
SUBJECT: SALE OF BLANKETS TO ISRAEL

REF: ROME 10948

1. WE WANT TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO ISRAELI REQUEST REF-  
TEL. EMBASSY AND HAAG SHOULD COOPERATE FULLY TO FURNISH  
ISRAELI ANY AVAILABLE BLANKETS IMMEDIATELY, ON SALES  
BASIS.

2. THIS MATTER SHOULD BE HANDLED ON NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS,  
AND ALL FUTURE MESSAGES SHOULD BE EXDIS. KISSINGER


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ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_  
NEGROPONTE \_\_\_\_\_  
ODEEN \_\_\_\_\_  
RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RODON \_\_\_\_\_  
SAUNDERS \_\_\_\_\_  
SONNLIEFELDT \_\_\_\_\_  
V.I.G. \_\_\_\_\_  
WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

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Department of State

Algiers  
War  
THE GOVERNMENT

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ACTION AF-18

INFO OCT-01 10-15 180-00 SS-15 NEA-10 NSC-10 PRS-01 PA-03  
USTA-15 CPR-02 SPC-03 PM-07 DRC-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00

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P 111608Z OCT 73  
FM USINT ALGIERS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9696  
INFO AMEMBSSY RABAT  
AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL ALGIERS 220

E.O.11652: GDS  
TAGS: AG, US  
SUBJ: DELIVERY OF NIXON'S LETTER TO BOUMEDIENE

REF: STATE 200625

1. DELIVERED PRESIDENT NIXON'S REPLY TO LETTER FROM BOUMEDIENE, AS PRESIDENT OF ALGERIA AND NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE, TO DEPSECGEN PRESIDENCY HAMDANI AT NOON OCTOBER 11. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION BUT DID NOT COMMENT ON CONTENTS OF LETTER.

2. IN DISCUSSION OF DEVELOPMENTS IN MIDDLE EAST, HAMDANI SAID THAT, WHOEVER EVENTUALLY GAINED UPPER HAND IN WAR, ISRAELI INVINCIBILITY HAD BEEN SHATTERED AND POST-WAR PERIOD WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS IMPORTANT FACT. ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO EXIST LIKE ANY OTHER STATE IN AREA AND WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO DICTATE TERMS. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE IN LONG-TERM INTEREST OF US TO DEAL WITH ISRAEL UNDER THESE NEW CONDITIONS.

3. I REVIEWED US ATTEMPTS TO BRING ABOUT CEASE FIRE, SHOWED HIM TEXT OF SCALI'S STATEMENT AT UN OCTOBER 9 AND

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ALGIER 00220 111935Z

EMPHASIZED OUR DESIRE TO REESTABLISH CONDITIONS THAT WOULD PROMOTE MOVEMENT TOWARD LONG-TERM SOLUTION.

4. HAMDANI SAID ALGERIA DID NOT EXPECT US TO BE FRIEND OF ARBAS AND ENEMY OF ISRAEL, HE HOPED US WOULD NOT, AS SOME BELIEVED, BEFRIEND OF ISRAEL AND ENEMY OF ARABS, MOST THAT ALGERIANS HOPED FOR WAS BALANCED US FRIENDSHIP WITH BOTH ARABS AND ISRAEL.

5. HAMDANI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT BOTH USSR AND US WOULD PROBABLY BE SENDING LIMITED MILITARY SUPPLIES TO MIDDLE EAST DURING COURSE OF WAR. I SUGGESTED THAT ALGERIANS LOOK CLOSELY AT ANY REPORTS THAT US WAS DIRECTLY INTERVENING ON ISRAELIS BEHALF, SOME ALGERIANS PRESS COMMENTS ON US SIXTH FLEET MOVEMENTS HAD BEEN TENDENTIOUS. I COULD ASSURE HIM THESE MOVEMENTS WERE PRECAUTIONARY AND THAT PRIMARY ROLE OF FLEET WAS TO ENSURE PROTECTION OF US CITIZENS IN WAR ZONE. HAMDANI SAID HE WOULD PASS THIS ON TO PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE WHO WOULD BE INTERESTED. HE NOTED, AND I AGREED, THAT ALGERIAN PRESS COMMENTS HAD ON WHOLE BEEN RESTRAINED.

6. ATTEMPTS TO SOUND OUT HAMDANI ON ALGERIAN DIPLOMATIC HIGHLIGHTS IN CONNECTION WITH BOUTEFLIKA'S TRIP TO NEW YORK DID NOT PRODUCE ANY NOTEWORTHY COMMENT.  
EALGETON

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
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Department of State *75 w-a*  
TELEGRAM

SECRET 710

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21 11  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 USSS-00

CCO-00 1026 W

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P 110048Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4690

S E C R E T BEIRUT 12020

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: AEMR  
SUBJECT: SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS

REF: STATE 201367

1. SITUATION THROUGHOUT MOST OF LEBANON REMAINS SURPRISINGLY CALM. ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT THUS FAR LESS VIRULENT THAN THAT IN 1967 WAR OR EVEN AFTER ISRAELI RAID ON BEIRUT IN APRIL THIS YEAR.

2. HOWEVER, REPORTS BEGINNING TO APPEAR TODAY OF AMERICAN RESUPPLY EFFORT TO ISRAEL MAY WELL CHANGE THIS PICTURE BY TOMORROW.

3. OVERNIGHT WE HAVE FURTHER REDUCED ALL EMB FILES TO MINIMUM REQUIRED IN EMERGENCY SITUATION (WILL BE DOWN TO ABOUT FOUR HOURS DESTRUCTION TIME BY TOMORROW).

4. I AM KEEPING CLOSE TABS ON SITUATION. ONLY PRESENT RECOMMENDATION ON E&E PLAN IS TO SUGGEST DEPT CONSULT APPROPRIATE COMMERCIAL CARRIER ON PURELY CONTINGENT BASIS TO ASSURE READY AVAILABILITY OF CHARTER AIRCRAFT IF NEEDED.  
BUFFUM

D/B  
④  
ANDREW \_\_\_\_\_  
HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORNIGS \_\_\_\_\_  
JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_  
NEGRONI \_\_\_\_\_  
OBEEIN \_\_\_\_\_  
RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RONDON \_\_\_\_\_  
SCHAFFNER \_\_\_\_\_  
SONNENFELD \_\_\_\_\_  
V.I.C. \_\_\_\_\_  
WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

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NUMBER 6 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD  
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET  
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UNCLASSIFIED 693

PAGE 01 BELGRA 04581 110947Z

15  
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NIC-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03  
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPR-03  
SS-15 ACDA-19 IO-15 NEA-10 AF-10 SAJ-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00  
AID-20 DRC-01 /159 W

\*\*\*\*\* 072414

R 110907Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7503  
USIA WASHDC  
INFO AMCONSUL ZAGREB

UNCLAS BELGRADE 4581

E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: PFOR, YO OGEN XF  
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION REPORT: MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

1. YUGOSLAV MEDIA OCT 10 CONTINUES EXTENSIVE NEWS COVERAGE OF MID-EAST CONFLICT WITH EMPHASIS ON REPORTS FROM ARAB SOURCES. LEADING BELGRADE DAILY POLITIKA DEVOTES NEARLY 3 ENTIRE PAGES TO CONFLICT WITH FRONT-PAGE HEADLINES: "BITTER FIGHTING ON GROUND, SEA AND AIR CONTINUES," AND, "BOMBS ON DAMASCUS AND CAIRO." (COMBINED RUETERS, AFP, TANJUG, MENA, UPI, AP REPORTS). SIMILAR COVERAGE BELGRADE DAILY BORBA. POLITIKA, OCT 10, CARRIES PAGE-ONE TANJUG ITEM ON BEIRUT NEWSPAPER AL ASHWAR'S CLAIM THAT U.S. IS URGENTLY SHIPPING NEWWEAPONS TO ISRAEL AND THAT "AIR BRIDGE" HAS PRACTICALLY BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV. "THIS STEPPED-UP AID IS IN CONNECTION WITH EARLIER OFFICIAL PROMISES THAT U.S. WILL COMPENSATE ISRAEL FOR EVERY PLANE LOST IN FIGHTING ARABS," CONCLUDED REPORT.

2. FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMENTATOR ALEKSANDAR NENADOVIC IN OCT 10 POLITKKA EDIT WRITES THAT EXTENSTON OF PRESENT STRUGGLE, "IM-

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PAGE 02 BELGRA 04581 110947Z

POSED ON ARABS BY ISRAELI POLICY OF AGGRESSION," COULD HAVE DISASTROUS INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES. EFFORTS AT UN DIPLOMACY TO END FIGHTING ARE HYPOCRITICAL, CONCLUDES EDIT, AS LONG AS MAIN CAUSE OF WAR, ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES, IS AVOIDED.

3. POLITIKAI'S NY CORR JURIJ GUSTINCIC IN OCT 10 COMMENTARY ENTITLED, "NO HURRY IN SECURITY COUNCIL," WRITES THAT US AND USSR HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT THAT MID-EAST WAR BE RESTRICTED "WITHIN LIMITS OF REGIONAL CONFLICT" AND SHOULD NOT HAVE INFLUENCE ON US-USSR RELATIONS.  
TOON

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UNCLASSIFIED 725

PAGE 01 JTDDA 04416 111120Z

13  
ACTION NEA=12

TINFO OCT-01 ISO-00 USIE-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00  
CIAE-00 USSS-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NS-10  
PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15 ACDA-19 IO-15 INRE-00  
DRC-01 OMB-01 /105 W

----- 073137

P 111037Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5156

UNCLAS JTDDA 4416

JOINT EMBASSY/USIS MESSAGE

EO 11652: N/A  
TAGS: MOPS, PBOR, SA  
SUBJECT: PRESS REACTION TO ARAB/ISRAEL FIGHTING

1. BANNERLINES CONTINUE TO HIGHLIGHT NEWS CONTINUED ARAB ADVANCES: 56 THOUSAND EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS SUCCESSFULLY CROSS SUEZ CANAL - ENEMY FAILS TO STOP ADVANCE OF SYRIAN FORCES DESPITE ITS HEAVY USE OF AIR ON THE FRONT - CHANGES MADE IN ENEMY COMMAND IN SINAI IN ATTEMPT TO SAVE SITUATION. OTHER HEADLINES REPORT "IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS;" NEWS REPORTS ON SOVIET SHIPMENTS OF WEAPONS TO ARABS AND AMERICAN TO ENEMY - HEAVY ZIONIST PRESSURE ON NIXON GOVERNMENT TO INTERVENE FOR BENEFIT OF ISRAEL - NIXON AND FULBRIGHT AFFIRM THAT AMERICAN EFFORTS ARE SINCERE AND JUST AND SEEK A LASTING PEACE.

2. RELATED FRONTPAGE STORIES CARRY FOLLOWING LEADS:  
MESSAGE FROM SADAT TO FAISAL REPORTS LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON TWO FRONTS; SAUDI CABINET MEETS UNDER PRINCE FADH TO DISCUSS APPROPRIATE SUPPORT FOR "THE SACRED ARAB STRUGGLE;" UPPER VOLTA SEVERS RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL; AMERICAN CALLS ON SOVIET UNION TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT.

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PAGE 02 JIDDA 04416 111120Z

3. IN FRONTPAGE EDITORIAL UNDER HEADING ALLAHU AKBAR (GOD IS GREAT) AL BILAD SUBMITTED: "THE MYTH OF ISRAELI SUPERIORITY HAS BEEN DESTROYED WITH THE COLLAPSE OF THE BAR LEV LINE, THE SMASHING UP OF THE FORTIFICATIONS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, THE PENETRATION OF THE BRAVE EGYPTIAN FORCES DEEP INTO THE SINAI AND THE DOWNING OF ISRAELI PLANES LIKE FLIES... GOD HAS KEPT HIS PROMISE, MADE HIS SOLDIERS VICTORIOUS AND NOT FAILED TO DEAL WITH THE OPPRESSOR." UKAZ IN EDITORIAL TITLED THE LOGIC OF AGGRESSION ADOPTED A TONE OF INCREDULITY: "AMERICA EXPRESSED STRANGEST LUGIC AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF THE FIGHTING BETWEEN ARABS AND THE USURPERS OF THEIR LAND. AMERICA WISHES THE ARABS TO STOP TRYING TO LIBERATE THEIR LAND AND TO RETREAT TU THE BORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION IN 1967. THIS STRANGE LOGIC MEANS THAT THE EAST BANK OF THE CANAL AND THE GOLAN HEIGHTS ARE NOT ARAB TERRITORY -- IT MEANS THAT ARABS HAVE LOST THEIR RIGHT TO REGAIN THE USURPED LAND AND IT MEANS THAT AMERICA SUPPORTS ONLY THE ENEMY AND STANDS IN THE FACE OF THE LEGITIMATE STRUGGLES WHICH THE ARABS ARE NOW UNDERTAKING... IT IS INDEED STRANGE TO BLAME THOSE WHO ARE RIGHT, WHO ARE CONTINUALLY EXPOSED TO THE ISREALI AGGRESSION, FOR TRYING TO RECOVER THEIR USURPED RIGHTS AND TERRITORY." AL MADINA UNDER HEADING WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE SIXTH DAY SAID: "THE WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST ENTERS ITS SIXTH DAY AMIDST RELIABLE NEWS OF CONTINUED ISREALI DEFEATS, AND THE ADMISSION BY JEWISH MILITARY LEADERS THAT THEIR LOSSES TOTAL A BILLION DOLLARS SO FAR, THE BATTLE OF TODAY IS NOT SIMILAR TO THAT OF 1967 WHICH TOOK SIX DAYS AND ENDED WITH THE ACCEPTANCE OF SC RESOLUTION BECAUSE THE LEADERS (ARAB) OF THAT WAR WANTED IT TO BE A WAR OF WORDS, THE FIRST STRIKE LAUNCHED BY THE ARAB FORCES ON BOTH SUEZ CANAL AND GOLAN EHIGHTS WAS DECISIVE, BUT THE ISRAELIS CLAIMED THAT THEY WERE TAKEN BY SURPRISE AND THAT THEY WERE PREPARING THEM-SELVES TO DRIVE BACK THE ARAB FORCES ON THE THIRD OR FOURTH DAY. THEN ISRAEL CLAIMED THAT THE POWER OF THE ARAB FORCES MADE HER RECONSIDER HER STRATEGY AND NOW SHE WANTS TO CONCENTRATE AGAINST THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND THEN THE SUEZ CANAL FRONT, BUT THERE IS NO ONE WHO CAN BELIEVE

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PAGE 03 JIDDA 04416 111120Z

THAT ISRAEL AFTER SIX DAYS OF WAR AND SEVERAL DEFEATS CAN ANEW DOMINATE THE SITUATION. BUT THERE IS A DANGER OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDE THE MIDDLE EAST REPRESENTED IN COMPENSATING ISRAEL HER LOSSES AND ESPECIALLY WARPLANES AS WAS DEMANDED BY EDWARD KENNEDY AND SOME OTHER SENATORS OF US CONGRESS. SUCH INTERFERENCE IS MUCH RULED OUT AT THE TIME BEING, AS ANY SUCH INTERFERENCE WILL HAVE DISASTROUS RESULTS...THERE IS A NEW ELEMENT IN THE SITUATION AND THAT IS THE CALL BY FRANCE TO MEDIATE. IF ISRAEL AGREES TO ACCEPT THE SC RESOLUTION AND WITHDRAWS, THEN PEACE COULD BE ACHIEVED, BUT IF ISRAEL DOES NOT AND CONTINUES TO REFUSE THAT RESOLUTION, THEN THE ARABS WILL CARRY OUT THE RESOLUTION IN FULL BY MEANS OF FORCE."

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**TELEGRAM**

SECRET 351

PAGE 01 STATE 201397

26  
ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT=01 TSO=00 CIAE=00 PM=07 H=03 INR=10 L=03 NSAE=00  
NSC=10 PA=03 RSC=01 PRS=01 SPC=03 SS=15 USIA=15  
ACDA=19 ID=15 INT=08 SSO=00 NSCE=00 INRE=00 EB=11  
COME=00 TRSE=00 /137 R

66621  
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARP:BW/RAMPELMEIER  
APPROVED BY: NEA: MR. SISCO  
NEA/ARP - MR. DICKMAN  
L- MR. MICHEL  
DOD/ISA - J. NOYES  
NEA: MR. ATHERTON  
S/S: MR. TWOHIE

070869

110519Z OCT 73  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMCON DHARHAN IMMEDIATE  
USMTM DHARHAN IMMEDIATE  
COE DIST ENGR RIYADH IMMEDIATE  
COE MEDDIV LIVORNO IMMEDIATE  
USCINCEUR IMMEDIATE  
SECDEF IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 201397

SECDEF FOR ISA AND DSAA

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MGPS, MARR, SA  
SUBJ: ROLE OF US MILITARY PERSONNEL AND US CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR  
EMPLOYEES IN EVENT SAUDIS BECOME INVOLVED IN HOSTILITIES

1. RECENT MESSAGES FROM JIDDA AND AMMAN INDICATE THAT ELEMENTS  
OF SAUDI ARABIAN ARMY MAY BE PREPARING TO MOVE OVERLAND FROM

SECRET

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SECRET

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TABUK THROUGH JORDAN TO SYRIAN FRONT. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT SAUDIS, IN PREPARING FOR THIS AND OTHER SAUDI MILITARY MEASURES, MAY SEEK ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION OF US MILITARY TRAINING OR ADVISORY PERSONNEL OR OF US CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD US MILITARY OR DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ASSIST OR PARTICIPATE IN READYING SAUDI ARMED FORCES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS, INVOLVING PRESENT MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES.

P. CASE OF AMERICAN PRIVATE COMPANIES HOLDING MILITARY CONTRACTS WITH SAG OBVIOUSLY PRESENTS SPECIAL PROBLEM. EMBASSY SHOULD CONTACT SENIOR US REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE FIRMS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND CONVEY TO THEM FOLLOWING MESSAGE;

A. AS MIDEAST HOSTILITIES CONTINUE, ODDS RISE SUBSTANTIALLY THAT SAUDI ARABIAN MILITARY FORCES MAY BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED EVEN IF ONLY ON SMALL TOKEN SCALE.

B. SHOULD SAUDIS APPROACH AMERICAN CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVES OR INDIVIDUAL AMERICAN EMPLOYEES TO ASSIST IN PREPARING SAUDI FORCES FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OUTSIDE OF THE KINGDOM, WE BELIEVE COMPANIES SHOULD SEEK WAYS TO DECLINE SUCH REQUESTS. USG WELL AWARE OF DIFFICULTIES COMPANIES MAY FACE IN TERMS THEIR FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS WITH MODA IF THEY REFUSE TO COOPERATE WITH SAUDI REQUESTS, BUT USG STRONGLY HOPES THEY WILL FIND WAY TACTFULLY TO TURN ASIDE REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE THAT WOULD CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO READINESS OF SAUDI ARMED FORCES TO TAKE PART IN OPERATIONS OUTSIDE OF KINGDOM.

C. IN EVENT SAUDIS DO BECOME INVOLVED IN FIGHTING AND ISRAELI FORCES RETALIATE AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS INSIDE SAUDI ARABIA, SITUATION OF COURSE BECOMES EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. HOWEVER, WE WOULD STILL STRONGLY ADVISE THAT COMPANIES AND INDIVIDUAL AMERICAN EMPLOYEES AVOID BECOMING DIRECTLY ENGAGED IN SAUDI MILITARY ACTIONS.

3. ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS CLEARED WITH DOD. KISSINGER

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PAGE 01 RABAT 4659 111733Z

45  
ACTION AF-18

INFO OCT-01 FUR-25 ISO-00 SSD-00 NSCE-00 USSS-00 CCO-00  
CIAE-00 UDDE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-14  
PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15 USTA-15 ACDA-19  
IO-15 UPR-02 SY-10 A-01 OC-06 NIC-01 AID-20 SCS-03  
SCA-01 DRC-01 PER-05 NEA-10 /209 W

P R (1)1705Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 341  
INFO USINT ALGIERS  
AMCONSUL CASABLANCA  
AMCONSUL TANGIER  
COMNAVTRACOM KENITRA  
COMNAVCOMMSTA SIDI YAHIA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS

----- 076689

CONFIDENTIAL RABAT 4659

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: XI XF PFOR MO  
SUBJECT: MOROCCAN SITREP ON SIXTH DAY OF MIDEAST WAR

1. LAST 24 HOURS IN MOROCCO DOMINATED BY ANNOUNCEMENT THAT SECOND FAR CONTINGENT ON ITS WAY TO MIDDLE EAST, THIS TIME TO EGYPT. DRILL ADDRESS DELIVERED ON OCTOBER 9 BY KING TO OFFICERS WHO ARE LEADING THIS FORCE WAS BROADCAST HERE ON EVENING TV NEWS OCTOBER 10. KING EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO KEEP TROOPS' DEPARTURE SECRET FOR A NUMBER OF HOURS FOR SECURITY REASONS. HE SAID HE ENVIED TROOPS ON THEIR MISSION AND NOTED THERE COULD BE NO BETTER DEATH THAN IN A HOLY WAR DURING RAMADAN. HE MENTIONED DEATHS OF MEMBERS OF FIRST FAR CONTINGENT AND SAID THAT THESE MEN, LIKE ANY OF SECOND CONTINGENT WHO MIGHT MEET DEATH, WOULD BE SAINTS AND MARTYRS IN THE OTHER WORLD. AT END OF SPEECH HE PRESENTED

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BATTLE STANDARD TO COLONEL MAJOR HATTMI WHO WILL COMMAND  
CONTINGENT.

2. DAO HAS REPORT THAT OVER 1,000 MEMBERS OF SECOND CONTINGENT  
HAVE ALREADY LEFT MOROCCO. SECOND CONTINGENT WILL REPORTEDLY  
NUMBER BETWEEN 3,000 AND 4,000.

3. MFDTA CONTINUE PREOCCUPIED WITH WAR. (VICE PRESIDENT  
AGENEW'S RESIGNATION WAS RELEGATED TO PAGE 3 OF PRO-  
GOVERNMENT LE MATIN AND MAROC SOIR), AND ATTITUDE IS  
EUPHORIC. RHAPSODIC ESTIMATES OF ISRAELI MATERIEL LOSSES  
ARE FREQUENT AND ENTRY INTO FRAY OF FORCES FROM OTHER ARAB  
NATIONS IS NOTED PROMINENTLY. OCTOBER 10 EVENING TELEVISION  
NEWS WAS DEVOTED LARGEY TO LONG EDITORIALS READ BY NEWSCASTERS  
NOTING STRENGTH OF ARAB POSITION NOW AS COMPARED TO 1967.  
RADIO THROUGHOUT DAY OCTOBER 10 INTERLACED REGULAR PROGRAMMING  
WITH REPLAYS OF SPEECHES MADE AT TIME OF DESPATCH OF FIRST  
MOROCCAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AND WITH MARTIAL MUSIC.  
MAJOR THEME IS THAT ARABS HAVE AVENGED EARLIER HUMILIATIONS  
AND HAVE OVERCOME "TUNIST-INSPIRED MYTH" THAT ISRAELIS  
INVINCIBLE AND ARABS "COWARDLY AND IGNORANT LOTHARIOS."

4. MFDTA HOSTILITY TO US HAS ALSO INCREASED. TV AND RADIO GAVE  
HEAVY COVERAGE TO REPORTS THAT USG WAS CONTEMPLATING NEW ARMS  
SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL, NOTING THAT REPORTS OF SOVIET ARMS  
DELIVERIES TO ARABS HAD EMANATED FROM WASHINGTON AND  
SAYING THAT THESE REPORTS MIGHT BE USED AS EXCUSE FOR  
RENEWED AMERICAN SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL. MUCH MORE EXTREME,  
THE OPPOSITION ISTIBBLALI L'OPINION PUBLISHED BY FAR ITS  
MOST ANTI-AMERICAN EDITION ON OCTOBER 11. IT GAVE BANNER  
HEADLINE TREATMENT TO NORFOLK LEDGER STAR STORY REPORTING  
THAT ISRAELI BOEING 707 HAD LEFT VIRGINIA BEACH TRANSPORTING  
SIDEWINDER AND SPARROW MISSILES TO ISRAEL, AND SUGGESTED  
THAT US FOLLOW ADVICE AGAINST ADMITTING JEWS TO US THAT  
PAPER SAID BENJAMIN FRANKLIN GAVE IN 1789. MAROC SOIR ALSO  
PICKED UP LEDGER STAR ITEM IN STORY WHICH ALSO MENTIONED  
REPORTS THAT NEW SOVIET MATERIEL WAS ARRIVING IN ARAB  
COUNTRIES.

5. WHILE OUTWARD RAMAUN CALM REMAINS, WE SENSE GROWING  
EMOTIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT AND SOME EVIDENCE OF ACCOMPANYING

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
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PAGE N3 RABAT N4659 111733Z

ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT. ENBOFF WHO WITNESSED OCTOBER 10 TV NEWSCAST IN COMPANY OF ORDINARILY APOLITICAL MOROCCANS WAS STRUCK BY INTENSTY OF THEIR INTREST IN UNFOLDING EVENTS. ONE STUDENT CHARACTERIZED KING'S SPEECH TO OFFICERS AS "POIGNANT." THERE HAVE BEEN SEVFRAL MINOR INCIDENTS OF HARASSMENT OF AMFRICANS AND OF MOROCCAN JEWS WORKING AT THE EMBASSY.

6. COMMENT. MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WATCHING WAR CLOSELY AND US MOVES BEING FOLLOWED WITH GREAT ATTENTION. GOVERNMENT HAS SOFAR MAINTAINED OUTWARDLY OBJECTIVE ATTITUDE. HOWEVER, COMBINATION OF ARAB DEFEAT AND CHARGES THAT US HAD INTERVENED IN ISRAELI'S FAVOR COULD WELL CAUSE GOM HOSTILITY.  
PARKER

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CONFIDENTIAL 884

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PAGE 01 USUN N 03842 112237Z

60  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 TSO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCU-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

NSAE-00 1026 W

O R 112209Z OCT 73 ZFF-4  
FM USMISSION USUN NEWYORK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0107  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
USINT CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL USUN 3842

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR XX XF SC UN  
SUBJ: SC MTG ON MIDDLE EAST OCT 11

AB  
079668

ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
KHNFBKA \_\_\_\_\_  
LEIBMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
LIVINE \_\_\_\_\_  
NICKOPONTE \_\_\_\_\_  
ODCEN \_\_\_\_\_  
ROBERT \_\_\_\_\_  
SALLOO \_\_\_\_\_  
SCHLESINGER \_\_\_\_\_  
SHALLOT \_\_\_\_\_  
V. I. G. \_\_\_\_\_  
VALSH \_\_\_\_\_

1. SC PRES MCINTYRE, IN ANSWER TO MY PHONE CALL,  
SAID HE HAD DECIDED TO CALL SC MTG AT 6:45 P.M. BECAUSE  
EL ZAYYAT HAD BEEN PRESSING HIM "VERY HARD" EVER SINCE LUNCH.  
EL ZAYYAT SAID HE HAD A "VERY IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO DELIVER"  
FROM HIS GOVT TO THE SC. MCINTYRE SAID HE SUGGESTED MTG BE  
DELAYED UNTIL TOMORROW, BUT EL ZAYYAT SAID HE WLD "PULL  
OUT ALL THE STOPS" IN A SPEECH BEFORE THE GA, SAYING PUBLICLY  
HE WAS BEING FORCED TO SPEAK THERE BECAUSE MCINTYRE  
HAD REFUSED URGENT SC MTG HE HAD REQUESTED. EL ZAYYAT  
DECLINED TO GIVE MCINTYRE ANY CLUE WHAT "IMPORTANT MESSAGE"  
WAS. (EL ZAYYAT, WHO WAS ALREADY SCHEDULED AS GA SPEAKER  
THIS AFTERNOON, WENT AHEAD WITH SCHEDULED APPEARANCE  
ANYHOW, HE CONFINED HIMSELF TO BRIEF ANNOUNCEMENT ON  
BEHALF OF HIS GOVT ALLEGING THAT ISRAELI AIR RAIDS ON PORT  
SAID AND CAIRO HAVE NOW KILLED OR WOUNDED 500 PERSONS.)



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REF ID: A777  
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2. MCINTYRE, IN CIRCUMSTANCES, SAID HE FELT HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO GO AHEAD AND CONVENE SC MTG AT 6:45 P.M. THIS EVENING EVEN THOUGH HE KNOWS MANY DELEGATES WLD BE UPSET OVER TIMING OF MEETING. MCINTYRE CLEARLY RANKLED AT WHAT HE CONSIDERS PRESSURE TACTICS BY EL ZAYYAT AND SAID EVEN THOUGH HE HAS CALLED MTG, HE WILL NOT "BREAK ANYONE'S LEG TO GET THEM IN THEIR SEATS AT THAT TIME."

3. MCINTYREIS PLAN IS TO SEEK TO LIMIT SC MTG TO EL ZAYYAT COMMENTS AND ANTICIPATED RIGHT OF REPLY BY ISRAELIS. BUT HE SAID HE DOUBTS HE CAN HOLD OFF OTHER SPEAKERS WHO NOW WISH TO BE HEARD. HE SAID NIGERIA NOW HAS ASKED TO JOIN IN DEBATE AND HAS SPEECH READY. OTHER SPEAKERS READY TO JOIN DEBATE, HE SAID, ARE: KENYA, GUINEA, PERU AND PANAMA. PERUVIAN RFP HAS VOLUNTEERED INFO TO ONE OF OUR EMBODS. HE BELIEVES VOICE OF LATIN AMRICA HAS NOT YET BEEN HEARD ON ME SITUATION AND THAT FOR THIS REASON HE IS ANXIOUS TO SPEAK.

SCALI



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PAGE #1 USUN N 03872 01 OF 06 120727Z

11  
ACTION ID=14

INFO OCT=01 ACDA=19 AF=10 AID=20 ARA=16 CIAE=00 COME=00  
NODE=00 EB=11 EA=11 SPC=03 PM=07 H=03 HEW=08 INR=10  
L=03 LAB=06 NEA=10 NSAE=00 NSC=10 OIC=04 PA=03 RSC=01  
DRC=01 SS=15 TRSE=00 USTA=15 PRS=01 ISO=00 DLOS=06  
COA=02 /210 W

===== 083545

P 120600Z OCT 73  
FM USMISSION USUN NY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 138  
INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY  
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
AMEMBASSY OSLO  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 6 USUN 3872

UNDIGEST

E.O. 11652: N/A

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PAGE 02 USUN N 03872 01 OF 06 120727Z

UNSC mtg

TAGS: OGPN  
SUBJ: USUN UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY NO. 18

10/1t

SECURITY COUNCIL-- MIDDLE EAST

AT REQUEST OF EGYPT, SC RECONVENED AT 7:00A.M., OCT. 11 AND EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS STRESSED ISRAELI BOMBING OF CIVILIAN TARGETS IN VIOLATION GENEVA CONVENTIONS. ISRAELI FONMIN SAID NEGOTIATIONS FOR SETTLEMENT COULD TAKE PLACE AFTER CEASEFIRE STRUCTURE RESTORED. SYG CALLED FOR END TO HOSTILITIES. NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 4:30P.M., OCT. 12.

SYG WALDHEIM DREW ATTENTION TO HIS STATEMENT CIRCULATED EARLIER AND REPEATED ITS CONCLUSION: HE HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT DIFFICULTY FOR COUNTRIES TO TURN FROM WAR TO PEACE, DID NOT WISH DEFLECT ANY GOVT FROM WHAT IT BELIEVED TO BE ITS LEGITIMATE SOVEREIGN AIMS, QUESTIONED WHETHER CONTINUATION OF WAR COULD ACHIEVE THOSE AIMS, AND EARNESTLY APPEALED TO GOVTS TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE COURSES BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE. HE HOPED SC MEMBERS AND OTHERS WOULD REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO END FIGHTING AND RESUME QUEST FOR JUST AND LASTING ME SETTLEMENT.

EGYPTIAN FONMIN EL-ZAYYAT SAID HE WOULD STUDY SYG'S STATEMENT. HE REPORTED VILLAGES IN NILE DELTA ATTACKED AND ABOUT 500 CIVILIANS KILLED. IF AIR RAIDS ON CIVILIAN TARGETS IN EGYPT CONTINUED, EGYPT WOULD DO ITS BEST TO DISSUADE ISRAEL FROM CONTINUING RAIDS--THAT WAS HIS MESSAGE TO SC.

SYRIANS DEPFONMIN ISMAIL SPOKE OF FURTHER ISRAELI ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN TARGETS WITH UNKNOWN NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, CHARGED NAPALM BEING USED, AND SAID SUCH "BARBARISM" WOULD ONLY MAKE SYRIA MORE DETERMINED TO FIGHT.

ISRAELI FONMIN EBAN ALSO SAID HE WOULD STUDY SYG'S STATEMENT. HE ASSERTED THOSE WHO ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR STARTING WAR ALSO HAD TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS CONSEQUENCES. HE ASKED WHY IT WAS HEINOUS TO BOMB AIR BASES IN SYRIA BUT PERFECTLY VALID TO DIRECT GROUND MISSILES

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AGAINST ISRAELI CIVILIAN TARGETS. ISRAELI OBJECTIVE  
WAS TO HIT ONLY MILITARY TARGETS BUT ONE COULD NOT BE CERTAIN  
CIVILIANS NOT HURT, HE POINTED OUT.

CISSE (GUINEA) EXPRESSED SOLIDARITY WITH ARABS, MENTIONED  
US VETO FEW MONTHS AGO, NOTED REPORTS 57 US PHANTOMS LANDED  
IN CYPRUS, AND STRESSED US RESPONSIBILITIES IN PRESENT  
SITUATION.

IN RIGHT OF REPLY, EL ZAYYAT SAID EGYPT INTENDED  
"TO GET" EVERY FOREIGN SOLDIER OF OCCUPATION ON ITS TERRITORY,  
1967 RES CLOSELY LINKED TO WITHDRAWAL, SUGGESTION CEASEFIRE  
WAS FOR UNLIMITED PERIOD IMPLIED OCCUPATION ALSO FOR UNLIMITED  
PERIOD, AND SUCH THEORY MADE RESISTENCE NATIONAL WELL  
AS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION.

PEREZ DE CUELLAR (PERU) THOUGHT IT WAS UP TO SC TO APPEAL  
FOR PRESENT FIGHTING TO END BUT SAID SC SHOULD NOT ADOPT  
ANY PROPOSAL INVOLVING EVEN TACIT APPROVAL OF OCCUPATION  
OF TERRITORY BY FORCE. BAROUDY (SAUDI ARABIA) SPOKE FOR 46  
MINUTES.

IN RIGHT OF REPLY, SYRIAN DEPFONMIN TALKED OF ISRAELI  
BOMBING OF CIVILIAN TARGETS AND NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF UN  
RESSES, ASKED IF ISRAEL INTENDED COMPLY WITH GENEVA  
CONVENTIONS, AND CALLED ISRAELI ATTACKS GENOCIDE. MAITLAND  
(UK) STATED REPORT MENTIONED BY GUINEA THAT PHANTOM  
AIRCRAFT STAGED AT BRITISH BASES IN CYPRUS EN ROUTE TO  
ISRAEL WAS "TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION."

TEKOAH (ISRAEL) NOTED BOTH EGYPT AND SYRIA DENIED THEIR  
EARLIER CHARGES ABOUT BOMBING CAIRO AND SOVIET CULTURAL  
CENTER AT DAMASCUS, SAID ARGUMENT THEY WERE "LIBERATING ARAB  
LAND" USED IN 1948, AND, CHARGING "NEW HITLERS" HAD  
ARISEN IN EGYPT AND SYRIA, SAID THAT WAS WHAT ISRAEL HAD  
TO FACE. ISMAIL, IN COUNTER REPLY, NOTED ISRAELI REP HAD  
NOT MENTIONED USE OF NAPALM.

MALIK (USSR), IN BOMBASTIC SPEECH, SUPPORTED ARABS,  
ADMITTED THERE WERE NOT AS MANY CASUALTIES IN "BARBARIC  
RAID" ON SOV CULTURAL CENTER AS FIRST REPORTED THOUGH PROPERTY

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DAMAGE GREATER, AND ACCUSED REP OF AGGRESSOR OF COMING BEFORE SC TO DEFEND "MURDER." OSMAN (EGYPT) CLAIMED ISRAELI REP DISTORTED HIS FONMIN'S STATEMENT ON CEASEFIRE. TEKOAH MADE SCATHING REPLY TO MALIK, RECALLING LATTER'S STALINIST ASSOCIATION AND SOVIET-NAZI COLLABORATION. BAROODY AGAIN SPOKE FOR HALF HOUR BEFORE SC PRES ADJOURNED COUNCIL AT 11:00P.M.

GA PLENARY--CONCLUDES GENERAL DEBATE

GA CONCLUDED 14 DAYS OF GENERAL DEBATE IN WHICH 118 MEMBERS EXPRESSED VIEWS. STATEMENTS WERE MADE OCT. 11 BY REPS DEMOCRATIC YEMEN, SWEDEN, FINLAND, LIBYA, CAR, EGYPT, JAMAICA, CONGO AND ALGERIA. PORTUGAL AND MAURITIUS SPOKE IN RIGHT OF REPLY. GA WILL HOLD SPECIAL MEETING OCT 12 TO CUMMEMORATE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF ILC, AND WILL ALSO CONSIDER GENERAL COMITEE'S RECOMMENDATION ON US ITEM ON WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE AND MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ENTRY INTO FORCE OF AMENDMENT TO CHARTER ART. 61 WHICH WILL DOUBLE ECOSOC'S MEMBERSHIP.

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20  
ACTION IO-14

TINFO OCT=01 AF=10 ARA=16 EA=11 NEA=10 RSC=01 ACDA=19 AID=20  
CIAE=00 COME=00 DODE=00 EB=11 H=03 HEW=08 INR=10 L=03  
LAB=06 NSAE=00 NSC=10 OIC=04 PA=03 PM=07 PRS=01 DRC=01  
SS=15 TRSE=00 USIA=15 SPC=03 ULUS=06 COA=02 ISO=00

/210 W

084173

P 120606Z OCT 73  
FM USMISSION USUN NY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 139  
INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY  
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
AMEMBASSY OSLO  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
ZENXIIISSTON IAEA VIENNA

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 6 USUN 3872

DEMOCRATIC YEMEN -- DUE TO ME STTUATION, FOMIN MOHAMMAD SALEH  
MOTTIE SET ASIDE PLANNED TEXT AND DEVOTED BRIEF SPEECH

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TO CONDEMNATION OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION AND  
US ROLE IN ME. COUNTING ON "MYTH OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY,"  
HE DECLARED, ISRAEL HAS UNDERTAKEN POLICY OF AGGRANDIZA-  
MENT, AGGRESSION AND TERRORISM, INCLUDING BOMBING OF  
CIVILIAN AREAS. IN RESPONSE TO ISRAELI PROVOCATIONS AND  
HAVING EXHAUSTED ALL MEANS OF SECURING LOST TERRITORY  
BY PEACE AND THROUGH SC, EGYPT AND SYRIA RESORTED TO  
LIBERATING THEIR LANDS BY FORCE, HE SAID. AS DUTY BOUND  
SUPPORT WAR OF LIBERATION UNTIL ARAB LANDS AND PALESTINIANS RIGHTS  
RESTORED. MOTTIE CHARGED US REP IN SC ASKED EGYPT  
AND SYRIA WITHDRAW FROM THEIR OWN  
TERRITORIES IN ORDER ALL PERPETUATION OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION.  
WHEN US REQUEST NOT SUPPORTED BY SC, FONMIN DECLARED USG  
MOVED SIXTH FLEET NEARER AREA OF CONFLICT. IT WAS REPORTED  
USG TRANSPORTING MILITARY PLANES AND EQUIPMENT TO ISREAL,  
HE ADDED. MOTTIE MAINTAINED  
US INVOLVEMENT IN ME DIRECTED AGAINST ALL ARAB PEOPLES AND PROVED  
ISRAELI AGGRESSION NOT ONLY CONDONED BUT SUSTAINED AND ENCOUR-  
AGED BY US. US CANNOT ESCAPE CONDEMNATION, HE DECLARED.  
SWEDEN -- IN SPEECH EMPHASIZING SOCIAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL  
ISSUES, FONMIN KRISTER WICHMAN URGED ME SETTLEMENT ON BASIS  
OF RES 242, TAKING ACCOUNT OF LEGITIMATE INTEREST OF ALL  
CONCERNED AND ESTABLISHING SECURITY FOR ALL STATES WITHIN  
RECOGNIZED FRONTIERS, HE SAID GREAT POWERS, SOME OF WHOM  
BEHIND MILITARY BUILD-UP IN AREA, HAVE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITY  
TO PROMOTE POLITICAL SOLUTION. HE NOTED ATTITUDE OF RELATIVE  
RESTRCTION OF SUPERPOWERS IN ME CONFLICT, ADDING  
DETENTE MIGHT FACILITATE EFFORTS TOWARDS SOLUTION.  
SAYING NOTHING ABOUT KOREA, WICHMAN WELCOMED AS POSITIVE  
DEVELOPMENTS IN INDO-CHINA PARIS PEACE AGREEMENT AND END OF  
US BOMBING IN CAMBODIA "UNDER PRESSURE FROM STRONG PUBLIC  
OPINION." HE URGED IN SVN RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND SETTLEMENT  
OF REFUGEES,  
WICHMAN CITED AGREEMENT BETWEEN TWO GERMAN STATES AS MOST  
IMPORTANT RESULT OF DETENTE AND NOTE UN ADMISSION OF BOTH  
DOES NOT AFFECT GERMAN RIGHT TO EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION.  
RECSCE, HE STATED AIM IS SOLVE EUR PROBLEMS, NOT PROMOTE EUR  
INTERESTS IN RES OF WORLD. FONMIN DECLARED DETENTE  
SHOULD BE CONFIRMED THROUGH DISARMAMENT MEASURES, HOPED  
FOR RESULTS IN MBFR, CALLED ON ALL MEMBERS WORK ACTIVELY

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FOR UN DISARMAMENT EFFORTS, AND STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF FORMULATING NEW RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ADJUSTED TO NEW TYPES OF CONFLICT AND MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. HE URGED SPECIAL BANS ON NAPAL, OTHER INCENDIARIES, AND HIGH-VELOCITY WEAPONS AND CALLED FOR BAN ON AREA BOMBING. WICKMAN CRITICIZED LACK OF ACCOMPLISHMENT IN CCD AND TERMED IMPORTNAT 974 CONFERENCE ON LIMITING BRUTALITY AND PROTECTING NON-COMBATANTS.

IN AFRICA, WICHMAN CALLED FOR INCREASED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AS EXPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL OPPOSITION TO COLONIALISM AND CALLED ON SC CONSIDER PORTUGUESE OPEN DIFIANCE OF HIS REQUEST TO NEGOTIATE ON SELF-DETERMINATION. NOTING GROWING PORTUGUESE-SR-SA COOPERATION, HE CALLED ON ALL STATES DEDICATED TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDEPENDENCE TO GIVE MORAL AND METERIAL SUPPORT TO REALIZE THESE AIMS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. HE URGED SUPPORT FOR EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL STEPS ON TORTURE AND EXPRESSED CONCERN ON RENAISSANCE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. CITING CHILE AS LATEST EXAMPLE OF BRUTAL MILITARY INTERVENTTION IN FAVOR OF PRIVILEGED GROUPS WITHIN STATES, FONMIN STATED "ECONOMIC INTERSTS OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO EVOLUTION WHICH LED TO COUP" HE URGED THAT PROTEST CREATED BY EVENTS IN CHILE "NOT DIE DOWN" AND CALLED FOR SPEEDY, POSITIVE REACTIONS AN APPEAL OF UN HIGH COMMISSIONER THAT STATES RECEIVE REFUGEES FROM CHILE, CITING GULF BETWEN DEVELOPED AND LDC'S AS SOURCE OF TENTION WHICH CAN SPARK CONFLICT, FONMIN DECLARED "POLICIES OF RICH COUNTRIES TEND TO COUNTERACT IN IMPORTANT

RESPECTS GOAL OF INTERNATIONAL EQUALITY". WICKMAN URGED SUPPORT FOR WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME AND HOPED PROPOSALS BY FAO DIRECTOR GENERAL LEAD TO FAO-CUNFERNCE LATER THIS AUTUMN. HE TERMED SECY KISSINGER'S PROPOSAL WELCOME AS "PART OF EFFORTS." FUNMIN SUPPORTED FORMULATION OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY ON ENVORINENT THROUGH GOVERNING COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME AND STATED UN SHOULD HAVE ROLE IN ENERGY CRISIS AS WLL, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT INTERESTS OF SMALLER AND ECONOMICALLY WEAKER STATES. (REPEATED INFO STOCKHOLM)

FINLAND -- FONMIN KARJALAINEN GAVE SHORT SPEECH WHICH CONCENTRATED ON EUROPEAN EFFORTS TOWARD GREATER SECURITY. CHARACTERIZING CURRENT ME SITUATION AS SERIOUS

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AND EXPLOSIVE, FINISH GOVT HOPES RESORT TO FORCE WILL BE TERMINATED IMMEDIATELY. HE CALLED UPON PARTIES CONCERNED AND GREAT POWERS TO HELP ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SOLUTION, WHICH SHOULD BE BASED ON RES 242. HE PLEDGED FULL SUPPORT TO EFFORTS OF SYG, UN, JARRING, FONMIN WELCOMED POSITIVE TREND INDETNE, APPRECIATING FACT THAT BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN MAJOR POWERS" IS PRECONDITION FOR IMPROVING OVERALL WORLD SITUATION." HE CONTINUED, NEVERTHELESS, AND GENUINE DETENTE IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF INTERESTS MEDIUM AND SMALL STATES TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. PRAISING UN AS FORUM THROUGH WHICH ALL VOICES HEARD, HE SAID MEMBERS SERVE NOT ONLY UN GOALS BUT OWN INTEREST BY SUPPORTING UN. HE URGED MEMBERS TO IMPROVE UN CAPACITY.

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**TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 STATE 202032

60  
ORIGIN AF-18

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 SCA-01 SCS-03 SSO-00 NSCE-00  
USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-07 L-03 NSC-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00  
INR-10 NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 PPT-02 VO-05  
A-01 SS-15 /092 R

DRAFTED BY AF/N:JJBLAKE/LTW  
APPROVED BY AF: DDNEWSOM  
SCA:FSMITH (IN SUBSTANCE)

O R 112207Z OCT 73  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE  
INFO USINT CAIRO

079774


C O N F I D E N T I A L S T A T E 202032

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: CVIS, CPAS, LY  
SUBJECT: PASSPORT PROBLEM  
REF: TRIPOLI 1208

IN LIGHT ASSURANCES GIVEN TO EMBASSY BY HUBAYSHI RE LARG  
WILLINGNESS WAIVE ARABIC LANGUAGE PASSPORT REQUIREMENT  
IN ORDER TO PERMIT TRANSIT AMERICAN TOURISTS FROM EGYPT,  
YOU ARE AUTHORIZED EXPRESS DEPARTMENT'S APPRECIATION OF  
LARG'S COOPERATION THIS MATTER AND INDICATE USG HAS DECIDED ]  
USE ARABIC IN ITS PASSPORTS AS OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAVE DONE.  
KISSINGER

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45



73 war

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 542

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01405 110844Z

20  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 150-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 1026 W

D 110600Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1027  
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

071976

SECRET ABU DHABI 1405

EXDIS

FROM CHARGE HOWELL

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGSE: AEMR, TC  
SUBJ: SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS

REF: STATE 201367

DIB  
TGS  
ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_  
NEGROPONTE \_\_\_\_\_  
ODEEN \_\_\_\_\_  
RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RONDON \_\_\_\_\_  
SOUNERS \_\_\_\_\_  
SONNENFELDT \_\_\_\_\_  
V.L.G. \_\_\_\_\_  
WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

1. REFTEL REQUESTS ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY SITUATIONS RE AMERICAN CITIZENS AND ADDITIONAL MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN RE E&E PLANNING.

2. AS OF 0500Z, LOCAL SECURITY SITUATION HAS NOT RPT NOT DETERIORATED SUBSTANTIALLY AS REGARDS AMCITS. CANNOT DISCOUNT APPEARANCE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM, WHICH ALREADY LATENT, ON PART INDIVIDUALS OR EVEN SMALL GROUPS, BUT GENERAL POPULATION FOLLOWING SITUATION CLOSELY WITH SOME SATISFACTION AT APPARENT SUCCESSES OF ARAB FORCES. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED ONE TELEPHONE BOMB THREAT WHICH IS PROBABLY TO BE EXPECTED. LOCAL AUTHORITIES RESPONDED QUICKLY TO STRENGTHEN GUARD ON CHANCERY AND RESIDENCES AND MAIN PROBLEM NOW IS TO DEVISE MEANS BY WHICH RESIDENTS EMBASSY BUILDING CAN PASS GUARDS TO ENTER OWN APARTMENTS. STILL BELIEVE WE CAN RELY ON BEST EFFORTS LOCAL AUTHORITIES SHOULD SITUATION DETERIORATE. ALSO FEEL ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT WILL MANIFEST ITSELF AGAINST CHANCERY AND/OR EMBASSY PERSONNEL BEFORE IT AFFECTS AMCITS.

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PAGE NO ABU DH 01405 110844Z

2. MUST STATE, HOWEVER, THAT LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS OF NEXT FEW DAYS WILL, IN MY VIEW, DEPEND AS MUCH ON ACTIONS OF USG AS ON SITUATION ALONG FRONT LINES. IN THIS REGARD, CAN FORESEE DETERIORATION OF LOCAL SITUATION IF (A) SIXTH FLFET MOVES INTO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN (CONTRARY TO LATEST OFFICIAL REPORTS WE HAVE, HERALD TRIBUNE REPORTS UNITS HAVE MOVED TO CRETE); (B) USG ADOPTS CONDEMNING OR ELATANTLY PRO-ISRAELI POLITICAL POSTURE IN UN OR ALIANCE; OR (C) USG ENGAGES IN RESUPPLY OF ISRAELIS WHILE WAR CONTINUES.

3. LIKENWISE SUBSTANTIAL REVERSES FOR ARABS ON BATTLEFIELD, PARTICULARLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH (C) ABOVE COULD QUICKLY CREATE EXPLOSIVE SITUATION LOCALLY. IT ALSO WORTH NOTING THAT FRAGILE FABRIC OF CIVILIZATION TENDING TOWARD IMMUNITY OF NON-COMBATANTS HAS ALREADY BEEN SHATTERED IN THIS WAR. WHILE CONCEDING THAT ISRAELIS HAVE UNCOUGHTEDLY ALSO TAKEN CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, MOST PUBLICIZED INCIDENTS OF CIVILIAN FATALITIES ARE THOSE IN DAMASCUS AND HOMS FAR BEHIND FRONT. AT SAME TIME USG CONTINUING ITS EFFORTS BRING FIGHTING TO END AND ESTABLISH BASIS FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION, WOULD HOPE WE COULD CLEARLY DISASSOCIATE OURSELVES FROM ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS, INCLUDING WHEREWITHALL TO DO SO. WITH EMOTIONS IN ARAB WORLD RUNNING HIGH, AM CONVINCED NOTHING WOULD ENDANGER AMCITS SO MUCH AS ARAB CONVICTION US IN COLLUSION WITH ISRAELIS IN ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN TARGETS.

4. RE ADDITIONAL MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN FOR E&E PLANNING, REQUEST DAPT. KEEP THIS AND OTHER POSTS FULLY INFORMED DEVELOPMENTS AND/OR INTENTIONS UNDER POINTS (A), (B), AND (C), PARA 2. WE NOT RECEIVING TIMELY SITREPS AND THEREFORE RELYING ON BBC. THIS WILL ALLOW ME AT LEAST SOME LEAD TIME IN ASSESSING LOCAL E&E MEASURES WHICH SHOULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT. WISH EMPHASIZE LOCAL ARAB POPULATION REACTS RATHER THAN ACTS IN PRESENT CRISIS AND EMBASSY ROLE SHOULD BE TO REACT SOMEWHAT QUICKER THAN LOCAL POPULATION, THIS POSSIBLE ONLY WITH STEADY FLOW OF ACCURATE INFO.

5. ALSO REQUEST DEPT. DESIGNATE, FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY, SAFEHAVEN FOR AMCITS IN UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. WISH EMPHASIZE THIS REQUEST NOT RPT NOT PROMPTED BY LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS OR ANTICIPATION OF EVACUATION. INDEED, BECAUSE CRISIS COULD BE DRAWN OUT AND FACT THAT MANY AMCITS IN



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SECRET

PAGE 03 ARU DH 01405 110844Z

AREA OVERGUNS FOR FIRST TIME AND THEREFORE MORE EXCITABLE  
THAN VETERANS, HAVE NOT RPT NOT ISSUED WARNING TO STANFEST.  
NEVERTHELESS, WITH MEAGRE ADMINISTRATIVE RESOURCES AT MY  
DISPOSAL, AM CONVINCED I MUST MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE PREPARATION  
IN ADVANCE FOR ALL EVENTUALITIES.  
HOWELL

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**TELEGRAM**

SECRET 604

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ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 FUR-25 IO-15 ISO-00 SSD-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00  
CIAE-00 DODE-00 USSS-00 USIE-00 PA-03 PRS-01 SCS-03  
SCA-01 OPR-02 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 INRE-00 A-01 SY-10  
PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-15 L-03 AF-10 /133 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.:HLK  
APPROVED BY NEA - ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR.  
NEA - MR. SISCO (SUBS)  
S/S - MR. PICKERING

----- 069158

Z P 110127Z OCT 73 ZFF4  
FM SFC STATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA FLASH  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 201391

E.O. 11652 - GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SA

SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH KING

(Faisal)

FOR CHARGE

1. YOU SHOULD ADOPT LISTENING POSTURE IN YOUR MEETING WITH FAISAL TOMORROW, TELLING HIM YOU WILL IMMEDIATELY CONVEY WHATEVER MESSAGE HE MAY HAVE TO HIGHEST LEVELS IN WASHINGTON, BUT NOT SEEKING TO RESPOND SUBSTANTIVELY TO HIM. IF IT WOULD BE HELPFUL, YOU COULD MAKE POINT THAT YOU HAD NOT HAD TIME TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS BETWEEN TIME YOU WERE SUMMONED AND YOUR DEPARTURE FOR RIYADH. GIVEN FLUID SITUATION, WE DO NOT WANT YOU TO DRAW UPON

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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SECRET

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EARLIER MESSAGES YOU HAVE RECEIVED RE CURRENT MIDDLE EAST  
SITUATION.

2. WE AGREE YOU SHOULD IF OPPORTUNITY ARISES MAKE  
POINT RE SECURITY AMERICAN COMMUNITY. KISSINGER

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 STATE 201377

61  
ORIGIN NEA-05

INFO OCT-01 TS0=00 SS=15 SSO=00 CCO=00 A=01 OPR=02 SY=10

INR=10 ( NSC=10,NSCE=00, ) R

DRAFTED BY NEA TASK FORCE:ESWALKER:PD  
APPROVED BY NEA TASK FORCE:MSTERNER  
S/S=0:RMWRIGHT

P 110113Z OCT 73  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

070596

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 201377

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: AREC, TS  
SUBJECT: WEEKLY MAC FLIGHT  
REF: TA 7905

WE ARE REPEATING CSAF MSG TO SCOTT AFB FOR YOUR INFO:  
QUOTE. OSD WISHES MAC MISSIONS SCHEDULED FOR ISRAEL HELD  
UP (INCLUDING 11 OCT 73 MISSION TO TEL AVIV) UNTIL FURTHER  
NOTIFIED PENDING DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS. SITUATION MAY BE  
CLARIFIED IN COUPLE OF DAYS, PERHAPS IN TIME FOR MISSION  
SCHEDULED NEXT WEEK. THIS CONFIRMS ORAL NOTICE TO  
DOC/COL HOOVER ON 10 OCT 73. UNQUOTE. KISSINGER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 USUN N 03819 110421Z

20  
ACTION 10-14

TINFO OCT=01 AF=10 ARA=16 EA=11 FUR=25 NEA=10 RSC=01 ISO=00  
CIAE=00 DODE=00 NSAE=00 NSCF=00 SS0=00 USIE=00 PM=07  
H=03 INR=10 L=03 NSC=10 PA=03 PRS=01 SPC=03 SS=15  
ACDA=19 INRE=00 USSS=00 CCO=00 OMB=01 DRC=01 /164 W  
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070349

O R 110334Z OCT 73 ZFT=4  
FM USMISSION USUN NY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 077  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
USINT CAIRO  
AMCONGEN JERUSALEM

CONFIDENTIAL USUN 3819

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR UN XF  
SUBJECT: ME IN SC

REF USUN 3799

PLEASE CORRECT REFTEL AS FOLLOWS. PARA 5 SHOULD READ:  
IN KEEPING WITH AMBASSADOR'S INSTRUCTIONS, USUN MISOFFS  
IN CONVERSATIONS WITH FRIENDLY NON-ALIGNED RE ME HAVE ASKED  
NO QUESTIONS BUT HAVE BEEN ALERT FOR ANY NEW ATTITUDES THAT  
MIGHT BE EXPRESSED. NO INFO WAS VOLUNTEERED THAT WOULD  
SUBSTANTIATE HYPOTHESIS THAT EGYPT AND SYRIA HAVE YET BEGUN  
TO SHIFT THEIR VIEWS ON SC ACTION. THERE HAS BEEN MINIMUM  
OF TALK OR SPECULATION BY ARABS, WHO APPARENTLY CONSIDER IT  
USELESS TO CONTEMPLATE SC RES OR SC MEETING SINCE THEY  
BELIEVE US WOULD DEMAND RETRUN TO PRF=OCT 6 LINES.

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 056

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PAGE 01 TUNIS 05894 111337Z

15  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00  
USSS-00 /026 W

074346

O R 111230Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3427  
INFO AMEMBASSY RABAT  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
AMEMBASSY SANAA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
USINT CAIRO  
USINT ALGIERS  
USUN NEW YORK 585

4  
ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
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RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RONDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
SANTOES \_\_\_\_\_  
SO KENFELDT \_\_\_\_\_  
V. H. G. \_\_\_\_\_  
WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

D/B

S E C R E T TUNIS 5894

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: XF, T, MOPS, MASS  
SUBJECT: DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF SIXTH FLEET MOVEMENTS AND REPORTS OF US SHIPMENTS OF ARMS TO ISRAEL

1. REPORTS OF US SIXTH FLEET MOVEMENTS IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, TOGETHER WITH RUMORS THAT USG WILL RESUPPLY ISRAEL WITH ARMS, ARE BEGINNING TO CAUSE APPREHENSION AMONG TUNISIANS ZUN#AND I WOULD SUPPOSE THROUGHOUT AREA. IN WAKE OF THESE REPORTS, WE ALREADY SENSE A COOLER RECEPTION

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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AT MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, WHICH HAS JUST SENT OFF PERHAPS 1,000 OR SO TROOPS TO FIGHT WITH EGYPT.

2. GENERAL ASSUMPTION IS THAT WHEN SIXTH FLEET MOVES EAST IT IS DOING SO FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OF AIDING ISRAEL. THERE IS LITTLE DISPOSITION TO BELIEVE THAT MOVEMENT OF SIXTH FLEET TO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MIGHT WELL BE TO PREPARE FOR POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN AREA. EMERGING TUNISIAN FEAR, FLOWING FROM REPORTS THAT U.S. CONGRESSMEN ARE ADVOCATING IMMEDIATE RESUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT AND ARMS TO ISRAEL, IS THAT MOVEMENT OF SIXTH FLEET MAY SOMEHOW BE CONNECTED WITH SUCH AN ARMS RESUPPLY EFFORT.

3. IN OUR CONTACTS WITH TUNISIANS WE ARE SEEKING TO ALLAY TUNISIAN SUSPICIONS. WE ARE POINTING OUT THAT SIXTH FLEET MOVEMENT IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN IS ROUTING PRE-CAUTION RELATED TO POSSIBLE NEED FOR EVACUATION, AND THAT

USG HAS NO DESIRE TO INFLAME SITUATION. WE ARE HOLDING TO STANDARD POSITION THAT WE DO NOT COMMENT ON DETAILS OF OUR MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH COUNTRIES IN MIDDLE EAST.

4. NEVERTHELESS, WE MUST EXPECT SNOWBALLING OF POPULAR CONCERN AND ANTI-AMERICANISM AS REPORTS CONTINUE. IF, MEANWHILE, ARAB ARMIES SUFFER MAJOR REVERSSES -- AND TUNISIAN TROOPS ARE KILLED IN PROCESS -- THIS COULD WELL ERUPT INTO DISTURBANCES DIRECTED AT AMERICANS AND AMERICAN PROPERTY. IN THIS SITUATION BASIS WOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED FOR PINNING MUCH OF BLAME FOR ARAB DEFEAT ON US.

5. FOR THIS REASON I URGE THAT WASHINGTON DENY REPORTS OF ANY UNUSUAL SIXTH FLEET MOVEMENTS AND DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL PRACTICE BY STATING PUBLICLY THAT USG HAS NO INTENTION OF PROVIDING ISRAEL WITH ADDITIONAL ARMS WHILE HOSTILITIES CONTINUE-- UNLESS USSR MAKES MASSIVE SHIPMENTS TO ARAB SIDE. AS LONG AS WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT ISRAEL PROPER IS NOT THREATENED (I.E. INTEGRITY OF STATE OF ISRAEL IS NOT THREATENED) -- AS OUR ASSESSMENTS MUST UNDOUBTEDLY

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 TUNIS 05894 111337Z

Demonstrate -- we should make particular effort to avoid actions which might inflame Arab emotions, including giving them convenient excuse for blaming us if and when their armies suffer major reverses. Movement of Sixth Fleet to Eastern Mediterranean (or at least public acknowledgement by us of such movement) and popular Arab belief in reports of prospective USG arms resupply to Israel (owing in part to our failure to deny them) may well trigger a chain reaction of anti-American acts throughout Arab world which could ultimately even have implications for oil supply.

6. I frankly am unable to understand why we have to move Sixth Fleet in current situation. Fighting between Israelis and Arab armies is occupying in "occupied territory", in territory which international community has acknowledged should eventually be returned to Arabs and, indeed, in that small portion of territory which even Israeli government in its most ambitious plan has never claimed for its own in context of boundaries envisaged in ultimate peace settlement. Of course, UNSC Resolution 242 said Israel should withdraw only if Arabs agreed to lasting peace, and resolution obviously did not have in mind unilateral Arab effort to regain this territory. But point I am making is that Arab-Israeli fighting at extremities of occupied territory does not seem to warrant unusual US military activity, especially given potential harm that this activity can cause to overall American interests in area.

7. Decision to move Sixth Fleet for possible evacuation purposes should be carefully weighed in light of foregoing. Is there sufficient prospect of need to evacuate American personnel by sea to justify causing the commotion which this move creates? (most past evacuations from Middle East have been by air.) Or is it more likely that Sixth Fleet move becomes self-generating: does it not create or contribute to conditions in area which eventually require evacuation of Americans? I was struck in first days of Middle East war by absence of anti-American criticism in local press - until reports started circulating about



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PAGE 04 TUNIS 05894 111337Z

SIXTH FLEET MOVEMENT AND US ARMS RESUPPLY TO ISRAEL.  
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OF CONFLICT, WE WOULD COME OUT OF THIS WAR WITH OUR  
PEOPLE AND OUR INTERESTS IN AREA UNAFFECTED --  
AND THUS BE IN EXCELLENT POSITION TO RENEW OUR EFFORTS  
WITH REGARD TO A SETTLEMENT.

8. THIS IS BASED ON ASSESSMENT THAT EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS  
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SUEZ CANAL FOR PURPOSE OF STRENGTHENING THEIR BARGAINING  
POSITION IF AND WHEN PEACE EFFORTS ARE RESUMED. THEY  
CERTAINLY DO NOT HAVE CAPABILITY TO DO MORE.

9. I SHARE VIEW OF SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES IN AREA  
THAT CURRENT MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES MAY OFFER US AN  
OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT, RATHER THAN -- AS SOME  
AMERICAN COLUMNISTS ARE CONTENDING -- NECESSARILY JEOPARDIZE  
THIS PROSPECT. ONE OF MAJOR PROBLEMS IN INDUCING ARABS  
TO SIT AT NEGOTIATING TABLE HAS BEEN THEIR SENSE  
OF HUMILIATION (AFTER THREE DEFEATS AT HANDS OF ISRAEL),  
AND THEIR INFERIORITY COMPLEX VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL. EVEN  
IF, AS IS ALMOST CERTAIN, THE TIDE IN THE FIGHTING TURNS  
CLEARLY IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL, THE ARABS WILL HAVE SHOWN THAT FOR  
THE FIRST TIME IN FOUR WARS AGAINST ISRAEL THEY HAVE FOUGHT  
HARD AND WELL. ARABS WILL BE ABLE TO HOLD THEIR HEADS  
UP, AND IF EGYPTIAN ARMY IS LUCKY ENOUGH TO HOLD ON TO  
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ISRAEL FROM SOMETHING OF A POSITION OF STRENGTH RATHER  
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TO A GREATER EGYPTIAN DISPOSITION TO TALK TURKEY ABOUT A  
PEACE SETTLEMENT.

9. THAT IS WHY IN MY VIEW IT IS IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE  
SIXTH FLEET OUT OF IT, AND TO DAMPEN DOWN REPORTS OF  
SHIPMENT OF US ARMS TO ISRAEL.

SEELEY

NOTE BY DC/T: TUNIS 5894 (#) AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 USUN N 03831 112039Z

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64  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 NSAE-00 1026 W

D/B

078602

O R 112000Z OCT 73  
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 95  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
USINT CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

CONFIDENTIAL USUN 3831

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 GDS  
TAGS PFOR UNSC XF  
SUBJECT UN SECURITY COUNCIL: MIDDLE EAST

REF USUN 3827

1. SC PRESIDENT MCINTYRE (AUSTRALIA) PHONED JUST BEFORE 2:00 PM TO REPORT THAT NO SC MEETING SEEMS LIKELY TODAY OR TONIGHT. MCINTYRE REACHED THIS TENTATIVE CONCLUSION BECAUSE (A) SC MEETING WOULD CONFLICT WITH GA ACTIVITY, WITH SCHEDULED GENERAL DEBATE SPEECHES OF EGYPT AND ALGERIA AND ANTICIPATED ISRAELI REPLIES, AND (B) SYG IS NO LONGER PRESSING FOR MEETING, HAVING DECIDED TO EXPRESS HIMSELF "ANOTHER WAY." COMMENT: AMBASSADOR BENNETT HAD SPOKEN TWICE THIS MORNING TO MCINTYRE TO MAKE POINT (A), AND TO QUESTION UTILITY OF SYG STATEMENT IN SC AT THIS TIME. MCINTYRE CARRIED BOTH THESE ARGUMENTS TO SYG.

ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_  
LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_  
NEGROPONTE \_\_\_\_\_  
ODEEN \_\_\_\_\_  
RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RONDON \_\_\_\_\_  
SAUNDERS \_\_\_\_\_  
SONNENFELD \_\_\_\_\_  
V. I. G. \_\_\_\_\_  
WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 USUN N 03831 112009Z

2. EARLIER IN DAY SUDANESE PERM REP ABDULLA APPROACHED POLCOUNS AND ASKED WHEN SC WOULD MEET AND "DO SOMETHING." HE REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES VIEW THAT US HAD CONVENED SC, IT WAS NATURAL TO EXPECT WE HAD SOMETHING IN MIND, AND "WE ARE ALL WAITING FOR YOU." ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT SC COULD DO, ABDULLA REPLIED "THE US IS THE ONLY ONE THAT CAN TELL US."

3. JUST AFTERWARD, BUT BEFORE TELEPHONE CALL REPORTED PARA ONE ABOVE, WYNDHAM (AUSTRALIA) AND WEIR (UK) CONVERGED ON POLCOUNS IN UN CORRIDOR. WYNDHAM SAID THAT BECAUSE OF PRESSURE FROM SYG, MCINTYRE WAS "HOPING" SC MEETING WOULD BE POSSIBLE SOON. ASKED WHETHER AUSTRALIA AGREED WITH SYG'S VIEW THAT SC'S IMAGE WOULD BE IMPROVED BY PUBLIC DEBATE WHICH SURE TO BE VITUPERATIVE, WYNDHAM SAID NO. "BUT I SHOULD TELL YOU FRANKLY THAT MANY, INCLUDING MY AMBASSADOR, THINK THAT IT IS UP TO US TO DO SOMETHING SINCE IT WAS US THAT TOOK ISSUE TO SC." WEIR CONFIRMED THIS IS VIEW WIDELY HELD. POLCOUNS INFERRRED THAT WYNDHAM AND WEIR WERE HINTING THAT ONE OF SYG'S MOTIVES IN URGING MEETING WAS TO PUT SITUATIONAL PRESSURE ON US TO TAKE INITIATIVE.

4. LATEST DEVELOPMENT, BELIEVE IT OR NOT, IS SYG'S COMMENT TO SCHAUFELE AT LUNCH THAT HE WAS GLAD HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO DISSUADE MCINTYRE FROM CALLING SC MEETING.  
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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET 367

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PAGE 01 TUNIS 05894 111743Z

44  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO=00 CCO=00 SSD=00 NSCE=00 DODE=00 CIAE=00

USSS=00 1026 W

070829

O P 111230Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3427  
INFO AMEMBASSY RABAT  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
AMEMBASSY SANAA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
USINT CAIRO  
RUFNRS/USINT ALGIERS 2146  
USUN NEW YORK 585

ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_  
HOLDRIIDGE \_\_\_\_\_  
HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_  
JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_  
KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_  
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ORR \_\_\_\_\_  
RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RONDON \_\_\_\_\_  
SACHAROFF \_\_\_\_\_  
SCHLESINGER \_\_\_\_\_  
V. I. G. \_\_\_\_\_  
WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

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S E C R E T TUNIS 5894

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: XF, T, MOPS, MASS

SUBJECT: DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF SIXTH FLEET MOVEMENTS AND REPORTS OF US SHIPMENTS OF ARMS TO ISRAEL

1. REPORTS OF US SIXTH FLEET MOVEMENTS IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, TOGETHER WITH RUMORS THAT USG WILL RESUPPLY ISRAEL WITH ARMS, ARE BEGINNING TO CAUSE APPREHENSION



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TUNIS 05894 111743Z

AMONG TUNISIANS-- AND I WOULD SUPPOSE THROUGHOUT AREA, IN WAKE OF THESE REPORTS, WE ALREADY SENSE A COOLER RECEPTION AT MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, WHICH HAS JUST SENT OFF PERHAPS 1,000 OR SO TROOPS TO FIGHT WITH EGYPT.

2. GENERAL ASSUMPTION IS THAT WHEN SIXTH FLEET MOVES EAST IT IS DOING SO FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OF AIDING ISRAEL. THERE IS LITTLE DISPOSITION TO BELIEVE THAT MOVEMENT OF SIXTH FLEET TO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MIGHT WELL BE TO PREPARE FOR POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN AREA. EMERGING TUNISIAN FEAR, FLOWING FROM REPORTS THAT U.S. CONGRESSMEN ARE ADVOCATING IMMEDIATE RESUPPLY OF AIRCRAFT AND ARMS TO ISRAEL, IS THAT MOVEMENT OF SIXTH FLEET MAY SOMEHOW BE CONNECTED WITH SUCH AN ARMS RESUPPLY EFFORT.

3. IN OUR CONTACTS WITH TUNISIANS WE ARE SEEKING TO ALLAY TUNISIAN SUSPICIONS. WE ARE POINTING OUT THAT SIXTH FLEET MOVEMENT IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN IS ROUTING PRE-CAUTION RELATED TO POSSIBLE NEED FOR EVACUATION, AND THAT USG HAS NO DESIRE TO INFLAME SITUATION. WE ARE HOLDING TO STANDARD POSITION THAT WE DO NOT COMMENT ON DETAILS OF OUR MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH COUNTRIES IN MIDDLE EAST.

4. NEVERTHELESS, WE MUST EXPECT SNOWBALLING OF POPULAR CONCERN AND ANTI-AMERICANISM AS REPORTS CONTINUE. IF, MEANWHILE, ARAB ARMIES SUFFER MAJOR REVERSSES -- AND TUNISIAN TROOPS ARE KILLED IN PROCESS -- THIS COULD WELL ERUPT INTO DISTURBANCES DIRECTED AT AMERICANS AND AMERICAN PROPERTY. IN THIS SITUATION BASIS WOULD HAVE BEEN PROVIDED FOR PINNING MUCH OF BLAME FOR ARAB DEFEAT ON US.

5. FOR THIS REASON I URGE THAT WASHINGTON DENY REPORTS OF ANY UNUSUAL SIXTH FLEET MOVEMENTS AND DEVIATE FROM THE NORMAL PRACTICE BY STATING PUBLICLY THAT USG HAS NO INTENTION OF PROVIDING ISRAEL WITH ADDITIONAL ARMS WHILE HOSTILITIES CONTINUE-- UNLESS USSR MAKES MASSIVE SHIPMENTS TO ARAB SIDE. AS LONG AS WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT ISRAEL PROPER IS NOT THREATENED (I.E. INTEGRITY OF STATE OF ISRAEL IS NOT THREATENED) -- AS OUR ASSESSMENTS MUST UNDOUBTEDLY



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DEMONSTRATE WE SHOULD MAKE PARTICULAR EFFORT TO AVOID ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT DAMAGE US ARMY, INCLUDING GIVING THEM COVETOUS EXCUSE FOR BLAMING US IF AND WHEN THEIR ARMIES SUFFER MAJOR REVERSSES. MOVEMENT OF SIXTH FLEET TO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN (OR AT LEAST PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY US OF SUCH MOVEMENT) AND POPULAR ARAB RELIEF IN REPORTS OF PROSPECTIVE USE OF ARMS REQUIPPE TO ISRAEL (OWING IN PART TO OUR FAILURE TO DENY THEM) MAY WELL TRIGGER A CHAIN REACTION OF ANTI-AMERICAN ACTS THROUGHOUT ARAB WORLD WHICH COULD ULTIMATELY EVEN HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR OIL SUPPLY.

6. I FRANKLY AM UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE HAVE TO MOVE SIXTH FLEET IN CURRENT SITUATION. FIGHTING BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND ARAB ARMIES IS OCCURRING IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY, IN TERRITORY WHICH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS AGREED SHOULD EVENTUALLY BE RETURNED TO ARABS (POLENT, THE SMALL PORTION OF TERRITORY WHICH EVER ISRAEL GOVERNMENT IN ITS MOST AMBITIOUS PLAN HAS NEVER CLAIMED FOR ITS OWN IN CONTEXT OF BOUNDARIES ENVISAGED IN ULTIMATE PEACE SETTLEMENT. OF COURSE, UNSC RESOLUTION 242 SAID ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW ONLY IF ARABS AGREED TO LASTING PEACE, AND RESOLUTION OBVIOUSLY DID NOT HAVE IN MIND UNILATERAL ARAB EFFORT TO REGAIN THIS TERRITORY. BUT POINT I AM MAKING IS THAT ARAB-ISRAELI FIGHTING AT EXTREMITIES OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY DOES NOT SEEM TO WARRANT UNUSUAL US MILITARY ACTIVITY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN POTENTIAL HARM THAT THIS ACTIVITY CAN AUSE TO OVERALL AMERICAN INTERESTS IN AREA.

7. DECISION TO MOVE SIXTH FLEET FOR POSSIBLE EVACUATION PURPOSES SHOULD BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED IN LIGHT OF FOREGOING. IS THERE SUFFICIENT PROSPECT OF NEED TO EVACUATE AMERICAN PERSONNEL BY SEA TO JUSTIFY CRIMING THE COMMOTION WHICH THIS MOVE CREATES? (MUST PAST EVACUATIONS FROM MIDDLE EAST HAVE BEEN BY AIR.) OR IS IT MORE LIKELY THAT SIXTH FLEET MOVE BECOMES SELF-GENERATING? DOES IT NOT CREATE OR CONTRIBUTE TO CONDITIONS IN AREA WHICH EVENTUALLY REQUIRE EVACUATION OF AMERICANS? I WAS STRUCK IN FIRST DAYS OF MIDDLE EAST WAR BY ABSENCE OF ANTI-AMERICAN CRITICISM IN LOCAL PRESS - UNTIL REPORTS STARTED CIRCULATING ABOUT

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PAGE 04 TUNIS 05894 111743Z

SIXTH FLEET MOVEMENT AND US ARMS RESUPPLY TO ISRAEL.  
 IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT IF WE COULD JUST STAY CLEAR  
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 WITH REGARD TO A SETTLEMENT.

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 HAVE LIMITED OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING BEACHHEAD ACROSS  
 SUEZ CANAL FOR PURPOSE OF STRENGTHENING THEIR BARGAINING  
 POSITION IF AND WHEN PEACE EFFOTS ARE RESUME. THEY  
 CERTAINLY DO NOT HAVE CAPABILITY TO DO MORE.

9. I SHARE VIEW OF SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES IN AREA  
 THAT CURRENT MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES MAY OFFER US AN  
 OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT, RATHER THAN -- AS SOME  
 AMERICAN COLUMNISTS ARE CONTENDING -- NECESSARILY JEOPARDIZE  
 THIS PROSPECT. ONE OF MAJOR PROBLEMS IN INDUCING ARABS  
 TO SIT AT NEGOTIATING TABLE HAS BEEN THEIR SENSE  
 OF HUMILIATION (AFTER THREE DEFEATS AT HANDS OF ISRAEL),  
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 IF, AS IS ALMOST CERTAIN, THE TIDE IN THE FIGHTING TURNS  
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 THAN FROM THAT OF CHRONIC WEAKNESS. THIS SHOULD CONTRIBUTE  
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9. THAT IS WHY IN MY VIEW IT IS IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE  
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10/11  
**TELEGRAM**

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PAGE #1 USUN N 03869 120737Z

11  
ACTION IN-14

INFO OCT=73 EUR=25 NEA=10 ISO=00 AF=10 ARA=16 EA=11 RSC=01  
SSN=00 NSCE=00 USSS=00 CCN=00 CIAE=00 DODE=00 PM=07  
H=03 INR=10 L=03 NSAE=00 NSC=10 PA=03 PRS=01 SPC=03  
SS=15 USIA=15 ACDA=19 OMB=01 URC=01 /179 W  
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083688

R 120410Z OCT 73  
FM USMISSION USUN NY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 134  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMCONGEN JERUSALEM  
USINT CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 3869

EO. 11652 : GDS  
TAGS: PFOR XF  
SUBJ: ME IN SC

1. AT EGYP'S INSISTENT REQUEST, SC MET FVNING OCT 11 ARAB DELS ATTACKED ISRAEL FOR BOMBING CIVILIAN TARGETS IN EGYPT AND SYRIA IN VIOLATION OF GENEVA CONVENTION, NO RESOLTUONS WERE INTRODUCED.
2. MEETING BEGAN WITH SYG READING FINAL PORTION OF STATEMENT ISSUED EARLIER IN DAY (SEPTEL ) CALLING FOR CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.
3. EGYPT FONMIN ZAYYAT REPEATED CHARGES MADE TO PLENARY EARLIER IN DAY (SEPTEL) THAT TOTAL OF 500 EGYPTIAN CIVILIANS HAD BEEN KILLED OR WOUNDED IN SIRAEI AIR RAIDS ON PORT SAID AND OUTSKIRTS OF CAIRO, ALLEGING WIDESPREAD ATTACKS CARRIED OUT IN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 USUN N 03869 120737Z

TOWNS AND VILLAGES OF NILE DELTA, ZAYYAT ALSO ACCUSED ISRAELIS OF MAIMING CIVILIANS THROUGH AIR DROP OF BOOBY TRAPS.

4. ISRAEL FONMIN EBAN (AND LATER PERMREP TOKOAH IN RIGHT OF REPLAY) CHARGED ARABS WITH CONTINUING RECORD OF LIES -- BEGINNING WITH "NON-EXISTENT" IAF AIR ATTACKS PRECIPITATING WAR, AND GOING ON TO ALLEGED BOMBING OF CAIRO AND DEATH OF 30 SOVS IN DAMASCUS RAID. EBAN SAID ISRAEL'S OBJECTIVE WAS TO HIT ONLY MILITARY TARGETS. NEVERTHELESS, IN WAR NO ONE COULD BE CERTAIN CIVILIANS WOULD NOT BE HURT, AND RESPONSIBILITY LAY WITH EGYPT AND SYRIA WHO STARTED WAR. EBAN CONCLUDED THAT ONLY SOLUTION WAS "TO RESTORE CEASEFIRE STRUCTURE IN ALL ITS ELEMENTS," AFTER WHICH NEGOTIATIONS FOR PERMANENT SETTLEMENT COULD GET UNDER WAY

5. SYRIAN DEPUTY FONMIN ISMAIL, LIKE ZAYYAT, CHARGED ISRAELIS WITH ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN TARTETS. HE SAID ISRAEL HAD CRREID OUT AT LEAST THREE AIR ATTACKS WITH NAPALM IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LWW. INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS APPEAL TO STOP BOMBING OF CIVILIAN TARTETS WENT UNHEEDED. ISRAEL, HAVING LOST HOPE OF QYICK VICTORY IN FIELD, WAS TAKING REVENGE AGAINST CIVILIANS, AND SHOWED EVERY SIGN OF INTENDING TO CONTINUE ITS ILLEGAL ACTS.

6. GUINEA AND PERU GAVE GENERAL STATEMENTS, AND SEVERAL DELS EXERCISED RIGHTS OF REPLAY. UK, FOR ONE, TERMED "TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION" PRESS REPORT CITED BY GUINEA THAT AKROTIRI AIR ASE IN CYPRUS WAS BEING USED AS STAGING AREA FOR US SUPPLY OF PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL. SOV PERREP MALIK DELIVERED BOMBASTIC STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF ARABS. HE

REFERRED TO ISRAEL'S "BARBAROUS MURDER OF PEACEFUL CIVILIANS" AND ITS REPRESENTATIVES "GOEBBELS-LIKE HABIT OF LYING." HE ADMITTED NUMBER OF SOVS INJURED IN DAMASCUS WAS FEWER THAN FIRST REPORTED, BUT SAID EXTENT OF PROPERTY DAMAGE WAS GREATER. IN SCATHING REPLY, TEKOAH RECALLED MALIK'S STALINIST PAST AND ERA OF SOVIET - NAZI COLLAGORATION.

7. COMMENT: WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT EL-ZAYYAT'S URGENT REQUEST FOR MEETING TODAY WAS SOLELY FOR PURPOSES OF RENEWSING CHARGES OF ISRAELI ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS. MOST PLAUSIBLE ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION IS THAT EGYPTIAN INTENDED SOME OTHER INITIATIVE IN SC AND CHANGED THEIR MINDS AFTER MEETING SCHEDULED. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY MAY HAVE PLANNED TO EXPLOIT PRESS REPORTS ALLEGING US BOMBING EGYPT, ONLY

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*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 USUN N 03869 120737Z

TO BE THWARED BY WASNINGTON'S PROMPT DENTAL, IN ANY CASE,  
SESSION WAS PARTICULARLY SERILE EXERCISE. IN SUM, PERHAPS  
WE HAVE MERELY BEEN THE VICTIMS OF AN EGYPTIAN JOKE. EL-ZAYYAT,  
HAVING INSISTED ON AN EARLY EVENING MEETING, SAID HIS PIECE  
AND WENT OFF TO DINNER, LEAVING THE REST OF US TRAPPED IN A  
SMOKE - FILLED ROOM UNTIL 10:58 PM. HOPEFULLY HE WAS  
BEING PUT TO BETTER USE ELSEWHERE.  
SCALT

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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## PRIORITY /ROUTINE

MJR338SBA150  
DE RUSBAL #1856 2841030  
P R 111020Z UCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 72%

INFO USUN NEW YORK 1570  
AMCUNSUL BOMBAY  
AMCUNSUL CALCUTTA 1589  
AMCUNSUL MADRAS 9530

CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NEW DELHI 11056  
E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFIOR, IN, XF  
SUBJECT: INDIAN REACTION TO MIDDLE EAST FIGHTING  
REF: NEW DELHI 11708

1. INDIA CONTINUES ITS DISTANT, VERBAL SUPPORT FOR THE ARAB CAUSE. INTEREST IS HIGH IN THE WAR EVEN THOUGH INDIA'S ONLY DIRECT CONCERNS APPEAR TO BE FOR ITS OIL SUPPLY (NOT AFFECTED), COMMUNICATIONS ACROSS THE AREA (PERMITTED), AND WELFARE OF INDIAN CITIZENS (FOUR REPORTEDLY KILLED IN AN OCTOBER 10 ATTACK ON DAMASCUS).

2. MRS. GANDHI REITERATED TO A PRESS CONFERENCE IN ASSAM OCTOBER 10 INDIA'S FULL SUPPORT FOR THE ARABS BUT ALSO SAID THAT SHE DID NOT THINK INDIA COULD DO MUCH IN BRINGING ABOUT AN END TO THE WAR. "IT IS FOR THE ARAB STATES AND OTHERS TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO," SHE SAID. SHE DID NOT THINK INDIA WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE MUCH RETALIATORY ACTION FOR INJURY TO INDIAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL.

3. FOREIGN MINISTER SWARAN SINGH ON HIS RETURN FROM NEW YORK  
OCTOBER 10 EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN AT THE SITUATION, FOR  
WHICH HE BLAMED ISRAEL. HE SAID THE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT  
WAS FOR PEACE. INDIA STOOD FOR EARLY CEASEFIRE AND SETTLEMENT  
OF THE UNDERLYING CAUSES.

BY THE S.  
MOYNIHAN  
BT

QUANDT

PSN:055593 PAGE 01 UF 01 TOR:284/11:12Z DTG:111020Z JCT 73

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PRIORITY /ROUTINE  
ESA946KGA&97  
DE RUELSKG #5441 2841710  
P R 111645Z ACT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WAHSHDC PRIORITY 9686

INFO USINT CAIRO 2484  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2325  
AMCUSNSUL JERUSALEM 4736  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2655  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 432  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5510  
USUN 2616

S E C R E T AMMAN 5441

EXDIS  
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, FX  
SUBJECT: SOVIET FOULWARNING  
FOR THE HISTORICAL RECORD S  
SOVIETS WERE NOTIFIED OF SY  
BEFORE IT TOOK PLACE.  
BROWN  
BT

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EL QUANDT

PSN:056275 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:284/21:072 DTG:111645Z OCT 73

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10/11

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FLASH  
ES939AAA962  
DE RUESKG #5419 2840045  
7 110830Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TU SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9670

S E C R E T AMMAN 5419

EXDIS  
F.O. 11651: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFDR, JU  
SUBJ: SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO KING  
REF: STATE 201118

## Hussein reaction

To NAK msg

1. IN VIEW EXHAUSTION KING DID NOT AWAKEN HIM TO DELIVER REFTEL, GAVE IT TO LAID RIFAI. WILL SEE KING LATER THIS A.M.

2. AT FIRST RIFAR SAID DELAY REQUESTED IS TOO MUCH. AFTER A LENGTHY ARGUMENT OF ABOUT AN HOUR HE AGREED TO RECOMMEND TO KING THAT HE DELAY FINAL DECISION AS REQUESTED. HE THINKS KING WILL CONCUR.

3. KING RECEIVED ANOTHER PLEA FROM SYRIANS LAST NIGHT FOR IMMEDIATE DESPATCH OF ARMORED DIVISION. JORDANIANS ARE TEMPERIZING BY SENDING LIASION OFFICERS TO SYRIA.

4. NUNIM RIFAI AND KHISMASH ARE DUE BACK FROM CAIRO SHORTLY. IF THEY BRING FURTHER URGENT REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE MILITARY ACTION, KING WILL BE IN EVEN TOUGHER POSITION.

5. RIFAI IS VERY APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE FUTURE. MESSAGES FROM JIDDA KEEP ASKING WHEN THE JORDANIANS WILL MOVE. IF SAUDIS GET INTO ACTION AND TAKE CASUALTIES WHILE JORDANIANS STAY OUT, HE EXPECTS PROMPT CUT-OFF SAUDI AID AND CREATION OF AN ANTI-JORDANIAN BLUC IN ARAB WORLD. HE WARNS EXISTANCE OF HASHEMITE REGIME IS AT STAKE AND THAT U.S. SHOULD HAVE THIS IN MIND.

6. I TOLD HIM THAT HASHEMITE REGIME HAS WITHSTOOD BRAVELY  
EQUALLY GRAVE CRISES IN PAST, THAT HE SHOULD NOT GIVE IN  
TO PESSIMISM, AND THAT WE STAND BY OUR FRIENDS.

НАК · СОМСВЕТ · Н · РУАНДА

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FLASH /PRIORITY  
DL 110127Z OCT 73 21E4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY JIDDA FLASH 2900

INFO AMEMBASSY AFGHAN PRIORITY 4006  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 1099  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 8164  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 7992  
MISSION USON NEW YORK PRIORITY 3827

SECRET STATE 201391

F.O. 11652 - GDS  
TAGS: PFor, SA  
SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH KING

FOR CHARGE

instructions to  
Jidda re  
mtg with  
Faisal

1. YOU SHOULD ADOPT LISTENING POSTURE IN YOUR MEETING WITH FAISAL TOMORROW, TELLING HIM YOU WILL IMMEDIATELY CONVEY WHATEVER MESSAGE HE MAY HAVE TO HIGHEST LEVELS IN WASHINGTON, BUT NOT SEEKING TO RESPOND SUBSTANTIALLY TO HIM. IF IT WOULD BE HELPFUL, YOU COULD MAKE POINT THAT YOU HAD NOT HAD TIME TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS BETWEEN TIME YOU WERE SUMMONED AND YOUR DEPARTURE FOR RIYADH. GIVEN FLUID SITUATION, WE DO NOT WANT YOU TO DRAW UPON EARLIER MESSAGES YOU HAVE RECEIVED RE CURRENT MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.

2. WE AGREE YOU SHOULD IF OPPORTUNITY ARISES MAKE POINT RE SECURITY AMERICAN COMMUNITY. KISSINGER BT

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FLASH /DP IMMED  
ESA714AAB139  
DE RUESSA #4408 2832335  
Z D 102325Z OCT 73  
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5153

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1991  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 4601  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2667  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0658  
USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0902

S E C R E T JIDDA 4408

ED 11652: GUS  
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, SA, XF  
SUBJ: KING ASKS TO SLE CHARGE!  
REF: JIDDA 4402

1. CHIEF OF PROTOCOL FOR MIN INFORMED ME 0140 LOCAL THAT KING WISHES TO SEE ME IN RIYADH 1000 LOCAL.

2. WILL DEPART VIA 0700 FLIGHT, ARRIVING RIYADH 0820.  
COMMENT: WILL DRAW UPON STATE 200525 IN CASE US POSITION ON CEASE-FIRE COMES UP. ON HOSTILITIES IN GENERAL AND US POSITION CAN PROBABLY GUESS PRETTY CLOSELY WHAT FAYSAL WILL SAY: I MIGHT INDICATE THAT ALTHOUGH INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS FOR EARLY ACTION LACKING, US WOULD HOPE THAT NOTHING BE DONE THAT WOULD MAKE MORE DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX ANY PEACEMAKING EFFORTS.  
AS MEANS OF SEEKING REAFFIRMATION OF KING'S 1967 ASSURANCE U.S. COMMUNITY'S SECURITY, WOULD EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR ADDITIONAL SECURITY PROVIDED IN NUMBER OF CASES TO US COMPANIES AND INSTALLATIONS. WOULD STRESS ALSO THAT ANY SAUDI ACTIONS THAT MIGHT SERVE TO IMPEL JORDAN TOWARD HOSTILITIES, COULD HAVE DANGEROUS EFFECT ON STABILITY AND INTEGRITY OF S.A.'S VALUED AND MODERATE NORTHERN NEIGHBOR.

HORAN  
BT

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OP IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #1367 2840027  
D 110015Z OCT 73  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 4904  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1087  
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4642  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 2958  
AMCONSUL DHARAHAN IMMEDIATE 4283  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 8700  
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0939  
AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 2074  
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 2919  
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 5182  
USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 6791  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 7469  
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 6236  
AMCONSUL CASABLANCA IMMEDIATE 2256  
AMCONSUL TANGIER IMMEDIATE 1890  
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 6457  
USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0291  
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 2637

INFO AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 9037  
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 4388  
AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE 2369  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4199  
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 3417  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 3866  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 8141  
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 4724  
AMCONSUL BOMBAY IMMEDIATE 3720  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8161  
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 7496  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5582  
AMCONSUL STUTTGART IMMEDIATE 1659  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 7989  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4152

S E C R E T STATE 201367

EXDIS  
E.O. 11652: GDS

State asks all  
States to review  
E/E & safety  
of Americas

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TAGS: AEMR  
SUBJ: SAFETY OF AMERICAN CITIZENS

KUWAIT PASS DOHA AND MUSCAT

FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION AND PRINCIPAL OFFICERS

GIVEN CONTINUATION OF ARAB-ISRAELI WAR AND INCREASING  
REPORTS OF ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES,  
REQUEST YOU SUBMIT YOUR LATEST ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY  
SITUATION AS IT AFFECTS AMERICAN CITIZENS IN YOUR COUNTRY  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE ADDITIONAL ACTIONS, IF ANY, WE  
SHOULD BE TAKING IN E&E PLANNING. KISSINGER  
BT

Evac

PSN:054852 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:284/00144Z DTG:110015Z OCT 73

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OP IMMEDIATE ROUTINE  
DTB161  
DF RUEHNDT #3817 2840151  
D R (110)119Z OCT 73 ZFF-4  
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0074

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4237  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3637  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4433  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 8074  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4604  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 2075  
USINT CAIRO 3494  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 9176

CONFIDENTIAL USW 3817

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, XF, UN  
SUBJ: SC PRESIDENT'S CONSULTATIONS WITH AMB. SCALI ON  
NEXT SC MEETING ON THE  
REF: USUN 3977

1. SC PRESIDENT SIR LAURENCE MCINTYRE CALLED ON AMB. SCALI LATE AFTERNOON OCT. 10 TO CONSULT ON TIMING OF NEXT SC MEETING, MCINTYRE SAID SYG HAD BEEN PRESSING HIM TO HOLD MEETING OCT. 11, HIS MAIN CONCERN EVIDENTLY BEING TO AVOID IMPRESSION THAT SC WAS SITTING ON ITS HANDS.

2. MCINTYRE SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND SYG'S WORRY ABOUT UN'S REPUTATION, BUT "UNSEEMLY SHAMBLES" IN SC WOULD DO UN NO GOOD EITHER. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD NO DOUBT NEXT SESSION OF SC WOULD BEGIN WITH ISRAELI AMB. TEKOAH "COMING OUT OF HIS CORNER FIGHTING" TO TAKE ON Sov AMB. MALIK FOR HIS FALSE CHARGED AT LAST MEETING THAT ISRAEL HAD BOMBED CAIRO AND 30 Sov CITIZENS HAD BEEN KILLED IN DAMASCUS.

3. MCINTYRE SAID SYG WAS "CLIMBING ALL OVER MY BACK" AND FEELS HE MUST "DO SOMETHING" AND HE, MCINTYRE, WAS HAVING HARD TIME HOLDING HIM OFF. SYG'S PREFERENCE WAS TO ADDRESS SC. IF SC DID NOT MEET AND HE COULD NOT DO SO, HE PLANNED TO ISSUE STATEMENT IN FORM OF LETTER

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PAGE 01

TDR:284/02:147

DTG:110119Z OCT 73

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TO SC PRESIDENT, NOTING THAT HE RESORTED TO LETTER BECAUSE MCINTYRE WOULD NOT HOLD MEETING.

4. TO AMB. SCALI'S QUESTION, MCINTYRE SAID HE HAD NO IDEA WHAT CONTENT OF SYG'S STATEMENT WOULD BE. SCALI SAID IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT HOLDING MEETING WITH NOTHING BUT RINGING DECLARATION BY SYG, AND WITH PARTIES UNABLE AGREE EVEN ON NEED FOR ANY VERSION OF CEASEFIRE, WOULD BE WORSE THAN NO SESSION AT ALL. SCALI SAID HE NEVERTHELESS APPRECIATED MCINTYRE'S DILEMMA, AND WOULD URGENTLY REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS.

6. AFTER TELECON WITH DEPT., SCALI INFORMED MCINTYRE AND SYG THAT HE WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON TOMORROW MORNING AND COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY SC SESSION IN MORNING. SCALI SAID HE WOULD NOT EXCLUDE HIS RETURNING TO NEW YORK TO PARTICIPATE IN LATE AFTERNOON SESSION IF ONE WERE HELD BUT AT THIS STAGE HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON WHETHER TO FAVOR OR OPPOSE CONVENING OF SESSION TOMORROW.

7. MCINTYRE'S INTENTION, AS OF THIS EVENING, IS TO CONVENE MEETING AFTERNOON, OCT. 11.

SCALI  
BT

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